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ABSTRACT 
Practices, Perceptions and Performance: A Texas  
 
Cooperative Study. (December 2005) 
 
Amy D. Hagerman, B.S., Oklahoma State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:   Dr. John L. Park 
 
 
 
Agricultural cooperatives are a unique form of business whose performance is 
tied closely to the financial health of their farmer members. The changing business 
environment in Texas and other parts of the Midwest has put strain on farm and ranch 
owners as well as the cooperatives that serve them. As margins diminish and customer 
base grows smaller, cooperatives must become more financially efficient to remain 
economically viable.  
This study was aimed at identifying those operational decisions and company 
characteristics that separate successful, growing cooperative agribusinesses from 
stagnant ones through empirical analysis. In addition, through the use of directed acyclic 
graphs and econometric techniques, the study sought to explain the connection of 
manager practices and perceptions to organizational performance. The analysis was 
based on a survey of managers in the state of Texas operating a diverse group of 
agricultural cooperatives.  It did not include financial or utilities cooperatives.  
The results indicated that successful cooperatives were larger in size, had a 
smaller number of close competitors, and perceived loyalty to be a large issue for the 
iv 
cooperative. Strategic planning was utilized equally by successful and stagnant 
cooperatives. Successful cooperatives were more apt to have a formal equity redemption 
plan, but this did not appear to have a significant impact on financial performance.  
The directed graphs showed a strong impact of manager perceptions in the area 
of member loyalty and performance. Further econometric analysis brought us to the 
conclusion that performance group and perceptions have some measurable impact in the 
areas of competition and loyalty. This is evidenced by the coefficients of the slope and 
intercept shifters for performance group being different from zero. An understanding of 
the factors that have the greatest impact on performance, such as competition and 
loyalty, can assist cooperative management teams in making operational decisions to 
mitigate their greatest risks and weaknesses, leading to a stronger financial position.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Change is a natural part of life, and for the food and fiber system change is both 
exciting and fearful. The agricultural cooperative industry has been in a trend of 
consolidation since the mid-1980s (Zuelli 2003). For some, the changes in the current 
business environment has led to expansion, growth and well deserved financial success; 
however, not all cooperatives have shared this experience. Some struggle to adjust in this 
business environment and eventually sink into a state of financial stagnation, just trying 
to make it through one more year. The question remains, what makes some rise to the 
top while others barely stay afloat?  
The objective of this study is to identify those perceptions and practices that 
separate successful, growing cooperative agribusinesses from stagnant ones. 
Identification of best practices will serve two purposes. First, it will provide a better 
understanding of the cooperative’s organizational structure. Second, this information can 
then be utilized by cooperatives to improve their chances of success. In order to achieve 
these objectives, there must first be an understanding of what cooperatives “look like” 
today. Then, it must be recognized that both financial and non-financial factors impact 
performance. This recognition allows for an extension of the traditional performance 
analysis. Finally, a conclusion as to how cooperatives can achieve greater success should 
This thesis follows after the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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be sought. 
The most logical place to begin this discussion is with a brief overview of the 
cooperative model. This overview is important from the viewpoint that cooperatives are 
unique in many ways and these characteristics define how they operate. The ownership 
structure of a cooperative is such that company culture and non-financial factors become 
very important. The customers are the owners of the business; therefore, issues like 
community involvement, loyalty, and board competency are potentially of greater 
consequence than in an investor oriented firm (IOF). Furthermore, non-financial factors 
that are important for any business, like competition, membership structure, and 
management remain important.  
Empirical studies that combine financial and non-financial factors in such a way 
are limited. During these two decades, changes have occurred in the cooperative culture 
(the collective attitudes, actions, values and goals of the company) and business 
environment that warrant fresh study. As you will see, today’s cooperative business 
culture is more reflective of IOFs than of their traditional cooperative predecessors 
(Hogeland 2004).  
The culture of a company has a direct link to the owners and customers, which in 
the case of cooperatives are the same people. In general, cooperative membership was 
once homogenous made up primarily of medium sized farmers. However, modern trends 
have led to a bipolarization of cooperative membership where a small minority of large 
farmers provides the majority of sales volume. In 2002, 8% of farms generated 68% of 
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all farm production (Dunn et al. 2003).  This new diverse membership is creating 
challenges and conflicts to cooperative aims.  
This study will build on past theoretical, empirical and strategic business 
literature in order to discover a set of factors that drive cooperative performance. These 
factors may include financial factors such as sales volume and liabilities; it will also 
include operational variables like company size, number of business activities, board 
size, and membership size. In addition it will include non-financial and non-operational 
information on the perceptions of management on government policies, competition, 
member loyalty, technology adoption, pricing policies, and trends in agriculture. 
Studying the perceptions and practices of both successful and stagnant firms can shed 
new light on these factors of success.  
This paper is divided into seven chapters. The second chapter deals with the 
literature supporting this study and is used extensively in performing the analysis. The 
third chapter will present a description of our procedures, and then set forth the 
hypotheses of this study. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters will present the results and 
discussions of the statistical summary, directed graph analysis and regression analysis 
respectively. Finally, the seventh chapter will integrate these three pieces of the study 
into a summary and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
In order to understand the drivers behind cooperative performance, it is important 
to understand what cooperatives are, how they have behaved in the past and how they 
behave today. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) describes a 
cooperative as “an organization characterized by member ownership, member control, 
and member benefits.” Clearly, members are the true core of the business and provide 
the base on which cooperatives build their culture, principles and practices.  
The remainder of this section is split into four areas. A review of the history of 
cooperation in the U.S. provides background on the environment cooperatives thrive in 
and their foundation of member orientation. This will be followed by an address to the 
evolution of cooperative culture and its impact on performance. Next, the challenges to 
cooperators given their current business environment will be discussed. The final section 
will provide a review of select empirical studies that this study will build upon.  
2.1 History of Cooperation in the U.S.  
Since its introduction in the U.S., the cooperative form of business has continued 
to evolve. The first cooperative associations in the U.S. were modeled after the early 
successful cooperatives of Europe. In particular, many looked to the success of the 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers as a model for viable cooperative operations. 
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The Rochdale Society, formed in 1844, was an organization made up of 28 craftsmen 
who worked together to sell food and clothing. The founders, who are often referred to 
as the Rochdale Pioneers, were realists who chose to form because of dissatisfaction 
with the retail shopkeepers of the area that sold the goods the Pioneers made (Barton 
1989). Similarly, early U.S. cooperatives were designed to compete against monopoly 
power and to provide services that were as yet unavailable to their members. The 
agricultural cooperative movement gained strength with the formation of The Grange in 
1869. Local Grange chapters set up supply stores, grain elevators and other services for 
farmers (Fairbairn 2003). These chapters were the predecessors of the cooperative 
associations that incorporated largely between 1920 and 1950.  
During this time, the cooperative movement gained political favor as well. The 
federal government passed legislation that enabled legal cooperative formation, and even 
took an active role in establishing cooperative credit associations. The Great Depression 
1933 forced the nation into a severe economic crisis that, coupled with widespread 
drought and farmer migration, led to the desolation of agricultural businesses in the 
Midwest. In response, President Franklin D. Roosevelt offered a “New Deal” that took 
drastic measures to draw the nation together with a common national goal. The 
cooperative business form, which is based on ideals of individuals banding together for a 
common cause, was a natural business structure choice as the agricultural sector 
resurrected itself. The Federal Government’s support of the cooperative business form 
gave legitimacy to these new companies and created another barrier to monopoly power 
(Ingalsbe and Groves 1981). 
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Rural residents took advantage of these opportunities and became the founders of 
what we describe here as “traditional” cooperatives. These organizations are 
characterized by democratic control, limited return on equity capital, service at cost and 
open membership. These cooperatives have roots in fierce loyalty, a family like service 
culture, and a spirit of looking out for your neighbor. The cooperative was there for 
some farmers when no other business could meet their needs. Understandably, social 
influences were an important part of the culture surrounding these original cooperatives.  
In addition to the social and political influences on cooperative formation, 
competition had a significant role. Cooperatives have historically formed in industries 
during times when competition is weak and have declined when competition is robust 
(Cross and Buccola 2004). In the late 1800s and early 1900s farmers faced adverse 
competitive environments. Some were limited to a few companies that held market 
power, while others lacked needed services or market access.  Cooperatives acted as a 
competitive yardstick in that they priced their goods with the member’s interests in 
mind, forcing the competition to either lower their prices or move out of the area. The 
collective influence of members created bargaining power in their market. In areas 
where competition was non-existent the cooperative provided the goods and services 
they needed to operate.  
Cooperatives thrived during the mid 1900s. They provided supplies and marketed 
commodities for medium size farms in rural areas. In return for their loyalty, farmers 
were serviced at a low cost and received a dividend when the cooperative had a 
profitable year. Non-cooperative competition was almost non-existent in most areas, and 
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cooperatives were geographically spread so that competition among cooperatives was 
mild.  
However, farm demographics and the competitive environment have changed. 
Today, the greatest amount of commodities is produced by relatively few, albeit very 
large farmers. Technological advancement has brought the world, almost literally, to the 
farmers’ finger tips. Margins have declined to the point that loyalty is based on the best 
price. Today, cooperatives compete with cooperative and non-cooperative firms, 
wholesalers, direct retailers, and Internet suppliers. Some are struggling to adjust.  
2.2 A Changing Cooperative Culture 
One must first understand the ownership structure of the cooperative to truly 
appreciate the potential impact of their culture on their performance. Business ownership 
and control can be defined by the concept of property rights. Tietenberg defines property 
rights as a bundle of entitlements defining the owner’s rights, privileges and limitations 
for use of a resource (2003). However, it is only when property rights are well defined 
that the organization is considered to be efficient. More specifically well defined 
property rights must exhibit four traits: 
1. Universality: resources are privately owned and entitlements are specified.  
2. Exclusivity: all benefits and costs accrued from owning and using the business 
accrue to the owner and only the owner.  
3. Transferability: all rights can be transferred in voluntary exchange. 
4. Enforceability: rights are secure from involuntary seizure.  
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The cooperative model lives up to two of these four traits. Property rights of a 
cooperative should accrue to the user / owners of the business. In addition, the users are 
the only owners of the business, meeting the characteristic of universality. Enforceability 
is ensured by the purchase of common stock, which creates a legally binding ownership 
right to the business.  
However, since cooperatives are common property resources, exclusivity is not 
well defined. There are many stakeholders in a cooperative that have different levels of 
investment in the business. This leads to free-rider problems, which are common in 
traditional cooperatives, creating the potential for organizational failure. The traditional 
cooperative also violates the characteristic of transferability as members are not 
permitted to transfer their ownership rights directly to another member. In the mid 1900s 
the lack of transferability and poor definition of exclusivity were not a problem. 
Memberships were homogenous and their interests were common; therefore, they 
collectively minimized free rider problems. Furthermore, membership in traditional 
cooperatives is open; meaning anyone who meets membership criteria can join with no 
cap on the number of members. Open membership is a problem because there is no 
incentive to use the cooperative for all of a member’s needs (Zuelli 2004).  
In an attempt to better define member property rights, a new type of cooperative 
has gained in popularity since the 1990s. This “new generation” cooperative has a closed 
membership and allows delivery rights to be transferred. It still maintains universality 
and enforceability. These cooperative businesses have adjusted to correct the property 
rights failures that plague the traditional form.   
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This understanding of user / members ownership rights leads us to a discussion 
of cooperative culture. As discussed earlier, the cooperative was formed by and formed 
for the rural resident. These early cooperators created a culture centered on the user 
whose vested interest in the business gave them incentive to patronize that business. 
Since that time, changes in membership composition and within the business 
environment have caused a continued evolution of the cooperative business model. 
Particularly, the changes in membership composition have caused the traditional 
cooperative to experience organizational failure from poorly defined property rights. As 
memberships have changed and cooperative management teams have tried to adjust and 
survive, cooperative culture has moved away from its social roots to a more competitive, 
aggressive set of goals and ideals (Hogeland 2004, Hind 1997).  
Business culture is a driving force behind the performance of any company—
cooperative or otherwise (Deshpande, Farley and Webster1993, Kyriakopoulos, 
Meulenberg and Nilsson 2004, Hind 1997, Hogeland 2004). Authors like Hogeland and 
Hind recognize a general shift in cooperative culture; however it is unlikely that all 
cooperatives are making this transition smoothly. Management and boards of directors 
are still trying to satisfy the entire membership. Today, that may mean satisfying the 
needs of membership segments with opposing goals. Cooperatives that incorrectly treat 
their membership as homogenous face a more difficult transition from their old culture 
to a new culture.  
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Deshpande, Farley and Webster address the issue of transitioning from one type 
of culture to another. Their paper studied Japanese (non-cooperative) firms and the 
impact their firm culture had on performance. Organizational culture was modeled as 
one of four types (adapted from Cameron and Freeman 1991 and Quinn 1988): clan 
(which can be related to a traditional cooperative culture), adhocracy, hierarchy, and 
market (1993). The study’s results indicated that companies tend to transition from a 
clan culture to a market culture or from an adhocracy culture to a hierarchy culture. 
Rarely will a firm transition from a clan to an adhocracy or from a hierarchy to a market, 
and so on.  
A company may show characteristics of all four culture types, but most will 
exhibit a dominant culture. A closer look at the clan and market types shows a similarity 
to the culture transition taking place in cooperatives in the U.S. The clan culture is 
defined by cohesiveness, teamwork, sense of family, loyalty and tradition (Deshpande, 
Farley and Webster 1993). Interestingly, in a separate article released by the USDA, the 
traditional cooperative culture is described in much the same way. It was a socially 
based culture that relied on loyalty of user / owners and placed the needs of those user / 
owners above the well being of the cooperative (Hogeland 2004).  
In contrast, Deshpande, Farley and Webster’s market culture is defined by 
competitiveness, achievement orientation and strategic emphasis on competitive 
advantage and market superiority. Those firms that exhibited market culture out 
performed clan culture firms and were the highest performing of any of the four culture 
types. This can, again, be related to Hogeland’s work, which recommends that 
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cooperatives move away from their traditional “service” culture to a more competitive 
model in order to prosper in the new business environment. Although this transition 
sounds uncomplicated, individual cooperatives struggle with the turmoil caused by 
cultural transformation. In conclusion, effects of business environment and culture are 
easily seen on the surface of the industry. The goal of this work is to find the deeper 
undercurrent of cooperative change through empirical study in Texas. To do this, we 
must look to the challenges faced by cooperatives in today’s business environment. 
2.3 Challenges to Cooperatives  
The cooperative is a form of business that faces unique challenges in the business 
environment and creates unique challenges for the researcher. In a summary of a Rural 
Cooperative Business Service (RCBS) report (Grey and Kraenzle 2002), Dunn et al. 
reported what cooperative managers, directors and advisors feel are the issues that have 
the greatest impact on their business (2003). External to the cooperative, there were five 
issues of greatest concern: changing farm demographics, technological innovation, 
consolidation and industrialization, globalization, and consumerism.  
The trend of changing farm demographics has been thoroughly covered in other 
literature sources. For the purposes of Dunn’s study, the primary concern was the impact 
it has on cooperatives. Today’s membership is made up of very large, very small and 
medium sized farmers that each requires specific services, products and structures. 
Cooperatives must adapt to these special needs. This may mean diversification or it may 
mean specialization, depending on the situation of the specific cooperative.  
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Technological innovation is another area that has received much attention in the 
popular press. The agricultural sector has experienced many technology developments in 
transportation, information, and biotechnology since traditional cooperatives first formed 
in the U.S. For example, improvements in transportation efficiency have impacted the 
geographical spread of cooperatives. There is not the need for the amount of long term 
commodity storage in some areas, and members are able to harvest and haul longer 
distances. In addition, cooperatives and members are able to access information more 
quickly and directly than ever before. The third area, biotechnology, has been much 
debated, but appears to be here to stay. This wide variety of change has some 
cooperatives struggling to adjust in this growth area.  
Consolidation and industrialization is a fact. Cooperatives have entered stage 
four of their industry life cycle, and in all levels of the food and fiber system 
consolidation is the trend. Even the largest cooperatives are finding it difficult to exert 
market influence and bargaining power like they once did. Furthermore, small and 
medium sized cooperatives are either finding a niche market beyond their “traditional” 
membership or they are forced to join larger associations before going bankrupt.  
The market place that cooperatives compete in has expanded beyond the state, 
nation or continent to include the entire world. Management in particular must be aware 
of the opportunities that exist from this global market; however, there are also risks. 
How a management team deals with this new, expanded market place can determine 
their level of success. Cooperatives must learn to do business in this environment.  
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Perhaps the most complex issue in this list of five external challenges is 
consumerism. The loyalty borne during the Depression has dissipated and the new 
generation of user / owner is willing to shop for the best price. Some cooperatives are 
facing the decision of either catering to one type of member group or being forced to 
diversify to meet the needs of many member groups.  
In addition to external challenges, cooperatives also face significant challenges 
within their own organizations. Four internal challenges were identified by Dunn et al. 
These challenges are acquiring equity, diverging memberships, board effectiveness, and 
the federated model.  
Equity is a delicate issue in cooperatives, because of the close personal link 
between equity and the member / owners of the business. Acquiring equity was not 
difficult when many cooperatives formed in the early to mid twentieth century. 
According to Dunn et al., member / owners do not have the proper incentive to invest 
equity in the cooperative because the opportunity cost has become too great. This 
weakens the balance sheet and limits the company’s ability to adapt in the market. 
Furthermore, many cooperatives are not willing or able to properly utilize commercial 
debt as a part of the capitalization plan.  
The issue of diverging memberships has already been discussed in other parts of 
this paper. Memberships are becoming more heterogeneous. Cooperatives must create 
new business strategies to satisfy these diverging interests or begin targeting specific 
types of members.  
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Board effectiveness has held a place in the challenges of agribusiness 
cooperatives for decades. Boards of directors must invest the time and effort into having 
the knowledge and experience necessary to run a business that is dealing with all of the 
challenges listed here. In addition, most cooperatives are restricted to only having board 
members that are also users of the business. For agribusiness cooperatives whose 
memberships are made up solely of farmers, this can pose a knowledge problem. Board 
members do not have the knowledge for specific business ventures and sometimes 
hesitate to use outside consultants and advisors.  
The federated model is loosely defined as a cooperative that is owned by other 
cooperatives rather than by farmers at the base level. Often these are large companies 
that local cooperatives buy supplies from, and in return the federated cooperative gives 
the local cooperative dividends, which are passed on to farmer / members of the local 
cooperative. The federated model has recently come under fire due to some high profile 
business failures such as Agway and Farmland Industries. The main argument is that this 
model places power too far out of the hands of producers and that they are too diverse, 
making them unable to move with the nimbleness and swiftness needed in today’s 
marketplace (Dunn et al. 2003).   
Similar external and internal challenges have been discussed in the investor 
oriented firm (IOF) literature. Studies for both cooperatives and IOFs that look at these 
issues rarely consider them as a whole and more importantly, they fail to investigate how 
the cooperative’s perceptions of them impact performance.  
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2.4 Past Performance Studies 
 Although several empirical studies are available on performance factors, two 
warrant further discussion for our purposes. The first is an empirical analysis of grain 
elevators and farm supply businesses across the Midwest (Harling and Funk 1987). This 
study applies Porter’s generic strategies to both cooperative and non-cooperative 
businesses in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Kansas. Porter says that there are three 
strategies that every company uses either singly or in some combination: overall cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus. They work most effectively when used in some 
combination (Porter 1980). Harling and Funk applied Porter’s work and measured the 
impact each generic strategy had on performance.  
Return on assets (ROA) was chosen as a measure of performance for two 
reasons: 1) it measures how companies used their funds irrespective of how they were 
provided and 2) it is less biased than return on equity, return on investment and return on 
sales. When cooperatives were compared to non-cooperatives in the same industry, the 
results showed that being structured as a cooperative actually depresses performance as 
measured by ROA.  
The second study investigates Dutch cooperative enterprises, but follows an 
approach that can be applied to U.S. cooperatives as well. A unique characteristic of this 
study is that is looks to the causal relationships that exist within a cooperative. 
Moreover, it looks to the non-financial characteristics that have causal relationships in 
cooperatives. The authors include such variables as type of cooperative, type of 
customer base, competitive intensity, cost/pricing policies, control and ownership, as 
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well as a measure of market orientation and entrepreneurial firm culture (Kyriakopoulos, 
Meulenberg, and Nilsson 2004).  
The authors’ objective was to make general conclusions as to how cooperatives 
can better compete with IOFs. They concluded that cooperatives should create an 
entrepreneurial firm culture, which exhibits “growth oriented professional management, 
non-hierarchal structure, and innovative strategy and risk preference” (pp 391). The 
authors base this on past cooperative research and posit that having an entrepreneurial 
culture will greatly impact performance. For cooperatives, this means aggressively 
recruiting the best managers and employees, not depending on income from federated 
cooperatives, and placing themselves in the market to aggressively compete rather than 
just exist.  
In their discussion of the impact of pricing policies in the cooperative, the 
authors concluded that if membership is homogenous, pricing policy has very little 
impact on performance. However, Dunn et al and Hogeland specifically state that 
cooperative membership cannot generally be considered homogenous today. Some 
cooperatives are challenged greatly by diverging membership interests due to size of 
farms, age of members, and background of members. Kyriakopoulos, Meulenberg and 
Nilsson state that a cooperative with a membership that is heterogeneous will be 
significantly impacted by pricing policy. Specifically these companies should consider 
differential cost / pricing strategies to enhance their market orientation, which impacts 
their ability to compete, attract customers, and create value (2004).  
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Other studies have concentrated on the impact of technology adoption (see King 
and Shuker 1987), management (see Noe and Rebello 1996), and board effectiveness 
(see Fama and Jensen 1983), in addition to the issues addressed by Dunn et al. In 
reviewing the literature it becomes clear that empirical study of Texas cooperative 
performance has not been greatly pursued since the 1980s. Today, Texas is the number 
one producer of beef and cotton; it has the third largest number of cooperatives and is 
home to a diverse range of agricultural producers (RBS 2003). Conducting such a study 
is a logical next step based on the theoretical and methodological work that has already 
been done elsewhere.  
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 The literature review provides a sound base on which to build a methodology for 
this study. First, the challenges to cooperatives are diverse, therefore many variables 
must be considered. Second, there is no current data set available for Texas cooperatives 
that contain such information; therefore, primary data collection is necessary. Third, the 
non financial factors that have a pivotal role in the history of cooperation in the U.S. 
should be included somehow, and a balance must be struck between those non financial 
factors and the financial analysis. A financial and operational analysis of the business is 
necessary to offset any bias that may exist in using the perceptions of management. 
Essentially, the financial and operational information should corroborate the story that 
management tells. Finally, a way must be found to objectively separate the successful 
from stagnant agribusiness cooperatives.  
The procedures begin by with the primary data collection from cooperative 
managers. The variables that are collected through this are related to management 
perceptions of the various challenges cooperatives face in addition to financial and 
operation information. This information is used to do a financial and operational 
analysis, separate the successful from stagnant cooperatives and identify causes of 
financial performance in cooperatives. By understanding the financial and non financial 
drivers of performance, we obtain a “map” of the Texas cooperative industry. Finally, 
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regression analysis was used to identify any differences in the factors identified in the 
causal analysis between the successful and stagnant groups.  
3.1 Primary Data Collection  
The primary data collection consisted of Texas agribusinesses that are 
cooperative in form. Electrical, telephone, and financial cooperatives are significantly 
different than agricultural cooperatives, and warrant a separate study. However, all types 
of agribusiness cooperatives were included in the survey population; this should provide 
the most diverse sample available and allow for the analysis of subgroups within the 
industry.  
The survey of Texas cooperative management, including both quantitative data 
and qualitative data collection, was distributed for the fiscal year 2004. This survey was 
pre-tested on a small group of cooperative managers, professors in the management and 
finance fields, as well as a cooperative industry professional at the Texas Cooperative 
Council. The information requested was both self reported and accounting based in 
nature; this provides a robust picture of performance (Kyriakopoulos, Meulenberg and 
Nilsson 2004). The accounting information was based on the year ending in 2004. Due 
to accounting differences, the month of year end is variable across cooperatives.  
The selection of variables was based on past studies, the objectives of this study, 
and feedback from the pre-test. Self reported information was largely related to both the 
external and internal challenges cooperative face, and how the cooperative was 
strategically placing itself to meet those challenges. The survey questioned managers on 
their perceptions of issues relating to strategic management, financial performance, 
 
20 
pricing policies, technology adoption, board effectiveness, competition, equity, 
membership, the global market and cooperative mergers. The goal was to obtain a 
picture of how the cooperative was reacting to the challenges discussed in the literature 
section and the differences in perceptions between market segments.  
The survey was mailed to a population of 230 cooperative managers based on a 
mailing list provided by the Texas Cooperative Council. The list consisted of all 
cooperatives the TACC had knowledge of, both members of TACC and non-members; 
however, the TACC was unsure as to how many of the non-member cooperatives were 
actively operating. After removing financial and utilities cooperatives as well as those 
that did not have addresses, the list totaled 231 cooperatives. Because two cooperatives 
were managed by the same person, only one survey was sent to that person, giving a 
total mailing of 230 survey packets. Each packet contained two copies of the survey, one 
for the manager of the cooperative, and one for the chairperson of the board of directors. 
It also contained a letter outlining the purpose of the survey and a statement of 
confidentiality of responses. The surveys were numbered to provide anonymity and 
encourage them to be as open and honest in their answers as possible.  
Following the mailing, those cooperatives for which a phone number was 
available were called to remind them of the importance of the survey and to make sure 
that the packet had arrived in the mail. For those who did not receive it, a request to 
allow the packet to be re-mailed was made and also the option of filling the survey out 
online was offered.  
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These efforts lead to a 20% response rate among managers, making the sample 
population on managers 46 cooperatives. However, only a 6% response rate was 
obtained among directors. The director response rate was deemed too small to make any 
generalizations on the perceptions of directors and it was discovered in conversations 
with managers that the manager and board chairman were filling the questionnaire out 
together. Therefore, the director surveys were thrown out of the study due to small 
sample size and bias.  
The manager response rate was large enough to proceed with the study, but with 
caution due to the dangers of bias presented by a small survey sample. Not all of the 
respondents had complete financial information. The 37 cooperatives that had complete 
surveys represented 16% of the total population. Additionally, this sample represents 
approximately 9.46% of the $4,524 million in gross business volume (RBS 2003) that 
Texas cooperatives did in 2002. It is necessary to use 2002, because it is the most up to 
date information available on Texas cooperatives in aggregate. In addition this sample 
represents and serves 32.52% of the total cooperative members in Texas (RBS 2003) in 
2002. In the statistical analysis, each question is first analyzed independently, the sample 
for each variable consists of all complete surveys; therefore, the number of observations 
for each variable is reported in the statistical summary results chapter. The remainder of 
the analysis necessarily only includes the 37 complete surveys since the interaction 
among variables is considered.  
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3.2 Statistical Summary 
The procedures for the statistical summary were straight forward and simple. The 
first step was to look at the sample as a whole and identify any trends or apparently 
significant questions. The second step was to identify a way to separate the successful 
cooperatives from the stagnant ones and to then sort them into groups. The third step 
was to compare the statistics and ratios for the whole sample to the successful and 
stagnant subgroups. Finally, the two subgroups can be compared to each other to identify 
differences. The following section will provide the procedures used for each of these 
steps.  
In the first step of the statistical summary, all of the sample observations were 
used to develop summary statistics. These statistics were calculated in Microsoft Excel 
using the modeling tool Simetar. The purpose for running these statistics is to create a 
prior knowledge of the information and to develop a general idea of how the successful 
and stagnant groups compare. This becomes important as the analysis moves forward 
into the causal graphing phase. 
The second step is to separate the successful from the stagnant through financial 
performance. The literature suggests different procedures for measuring financial 
performance. The most obvious way is through the use of some financial measure. 
Options that have been previously utilized are return on assets, return on equity, market 
share, profit margin, growth relative to competition, customer orientation, liquidity, 
leverage, and asset turnover (See Harling and Funk 1987, Nerver and Slater 1990, 
Kyriakopoulos, Meulenberg and Nilsson 2004, and Rotan 2004).  
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For this study, a combination of two historical performance measures was used. 
The first measure is return on assets (ROA). This measure was chosen based on its use 
as an unbiased measurement of short term financial health and performance. 
Furthermore, ROA is a good measure of how efficiently the cooperative is using its 
funds (Harling and Funk 1987). However, because this study has only one year of 
information available, it is not possible to track ROA over time to obtain a picture of 
long term performance, so a measure of long term viability was chosen. The equity to 
assets (E/A) ratio was chosen over other, more mainstream, long term ratios because of 
the importance equity plays in the cooperative form of business.  
After calculating the two ratios based on the financial information, the next step 
was to determine where to draw the line between what was deemed successful and what 
was deemed stagnant. CoBank, the primary financial lender to cooperative 
agribusinesses in Texas, provided the benchmark numbers for these two performance 
measures and it was decided to divide the data into four groups. The benchmark for 
ROA is 8% (or 5% in drought years) and for E/A the benchmark is 50%. It was 
determined that Texas did not experience a significant drought in 2004, so the 8% ROA 
benchmark was used. Figure 1 shows the division in the respondents along these 
benchmarks.  
The first group was those cooperatives deemed successful because they exceeded 
benchmark standards in both performance measures. These cooperatives lie in the upper 
right hand quadrant of this graph and are labeled “top performers”. The second group 
was those cooperatives that were short term performers, in other words they had  
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Figure 1: Performance Matrix for Respondents 
ROA: Return on Assets 
E/A: Equity to Assets Ratio 
 
 
exceeded the benchmark for ROA but fell short of the benchmark for E/A. These 
cooperatives are located in the upper left hand quadrant of Figure 1. The third group was 
those cooperatives that were considered long term performers, exceeding the E/A 
benchmark but falling short of the ROA benchmark. These cooperatives are located in 
the lower right hand quadrant of Figure 1. The fourth and final group was those 
cooperatives that were considered stagnant; having fallen short of the benchmarks for 
both ROA and E/A. These cooperatives, labeled bottom performers, are located in the 
lower left hand quadrant.  
It was decided that, while the short and long term performer groups were 
interesting and could be further analyzed in the future, the analysis of these two groups 
does not bring us closer to the objective of this study. Therefore, they were set aside for 
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this study, but could be considered for further analysis at a later date. Simetar was again 
used to run separate sets of summary statistics for the two subgroups of interest. These 
statistics can then be compared from subgroup to the entire sample and between 
subgroups. This comparison first identifies whether or not the measures chosen are 
adequate to sort the two groups, and whether these groups, when separated, are 
significantly different from the sample as a whole. This allows us to consider whether or 
not the characteristics and financial measures we have chosen are sufficient for 
comparing the two groups.   
The statistical summary performed in Simetar included analysis of sample mean, 
standard deviation, min, max, median, 95% upper confidence interval, and 95% lower 
confidence interval. This same analysis was performed on the two subgroups identified 
through benchmark analysis as discussed earlier. Each variable was analyzed 
independently of the other variables for this portion of the analysis. Their correlation to 
each other and their causal interrelationships were analyzed through the use of causal 
diagrams and regression analysis.   
3.3 Causal Diagrams  
The idea of cause and effect is an old and well known one. We learn from a 
young age that there is a unidirectional movement from cause to effect. If I touch 
something hot, I burn my hand. Historically, the use of causation in economics has been 
limited primarily to structural equations modeling. Causal modeling has been used even 
less in those applications requiring the use of statistical theory; primarily because only 
recently has a harmonious relationship been established between statistical theory and 
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causation theory. The cause and effect relationship is often presented as being one in 
which there are “true” causes and “true” effects. It leaves no room for the uncertainties 
that exist in the real world. Statistics on the other hand accounts for uncertainties by 
working with probabilities rather than concrete events. This difference caused a great 
deal of disharmony between causal and statistics camps; however, steps have been taken 
to integrate these two areas into one. Dr. Judea Pearl has been at the forefront of this and 
presents such a marriage of probability theory and causation in his 2000 book Causality.  
The uncertainty or paradox occurs, rarely in the individual event, such as the hot 
pan / burnt hand example above, but when it is extended to chains of cause and effect 
relationships, or causal chains. Continuing with our previous example, if I apply heat to 
a pan, the effect is a hot pan. If I touch a hot pan, the effect is a burnt hand. However, 
heating a pan is not a cause of burning my hand unless the intermediate event of 
touching the pan occurs. For this reason causality is written in the language of 
probability theory. By using probabilities, there can be room for uncertainty.  
There are certain conditions that must be met though, to be sure that our model is 
robust. When building a causal model, there must first be a minimal model which we can 
intervene in to observe new effects. This model is the simplest model that is still 
consistent with the data. This model would necessarily be stable and robust. As a visual 
test of robustness, the skeletal minimal model would still be present after intervention 
(Pearl 2000).  
The selection of variables for this model is extremely important. It is impossible 
to know if every possible variable that could have a causal relationship on the 
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performance of these cooperatives has been accounted for. If one could identify and 
possess infinite observations on every variable in the model, then there would be no 
doubt that the model is robust. Unfortunately such knowledge is improbable if not 
impossible to obtain. A benefit of the use of directed acyclic graphs, which will be 
explained below, is that they are by their very nature a stable model (See Pearl 2000 for 
further details).  
In addition, the absence of certain latent variables can have a profound impact on 
the model and result in spurious causal relationships. Therefore, some causal 
assumptions must be made as to the variables that are collected and utilized in this causal 
study. Glymour, Scheines and Spirtes identified three primary ways in which a case 
could be made for the causal assumptions in a model. The first is a prior knowledge or 
well justified theory that would imply a unique set of causal assumptions or reduce the 
number of alternative assumptions to a small number. This however, must be based on 
sound, severely tested theory. The second model is the use of experimental controls to 
isolate causal effects. As the authors point out, this is rarely feasible, particularly in areas 
such as economics. The final option is to use prior knowledge to conduct a systematic 
search for alternative models that is likely to provide the best available explanation of 
the data. To this effect these three professionals developed an algorithm that works in a 
mathematical program to do just this.  
The probability of getting the “true” causal chain is very low due to the 
uncertainty involved in working with empirical data. However, by using a PC 
Algorithm, their program (TETRAD IV) can build from raw data a model that is the 
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most robust out of the different possibilities. This model is not meant to estimate 
parameters but instead to discover models with mathematical properties that explain the 
interrelationships among the variables collected in the simplest terms, without sacrificing 
the robustness of the model (Glymour, Sheines and Spirtes 1988).   
The remainder of this section will work to develop the methodology of 
developing casual graphs and explain the mental procedure used for developing them. 
Specifically, this study seeks to identify directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), a type of causal 
graph that has certain properties that make interpretation and analysis less complex. 
These graphs are also known as Bayesian Networks.  
The word “directed” implies that there is a direction of causation between two or 
more variables. In the case of cooperatives there is a strong argument for the validity of 
unidirectional movement between variables. This argument is based on the fact that 
cooperative variables can change gradually overtime in response to a dynamic market 
(Kyriakopoulos, Meulenberg and Nilsson 2004).  
This study does not include any temporal analysis because it is only a snapshot of 
one year’s performance; however, because this relationship between the external market 
and the cooperative exists, the argument for unidirectional movement still holds. Future 
analysis could include multiple years of data, creating a temporal dimension to the data. 
An argument could be made for a temporal dimension based on the operational variables 
of the business changing very slowly compared to the year by year volatility of the 
financial information; however, for the purposes of this study no temporal dimension 
will be considered.  
 
29 
The term “acyclic” implies that no path leading away from a variable will later 
return to that same variable. In other words there is no path in which a variable causes 
itself (Pearl 1995). The special quality of these graphs is that they provide a more robust 
model with fewer opportunities for spurious results than graphs that are undirected or 
cyclic. Furthermore the probability theory that is used in developing the mathematical 
models behind the DAGs is less complex than when models are undirected, bidirected or 
cyclic.  
The steps to developing these graphs are to first identify all of the variables that, 
given previous knowledge of the industry and market, will be applicable to the model. 
Then all of the possible correlations that might exist are identified and skeletal models 
are built. A skeletal model is one in which relationships among variables have been 
identified, but in which no directionality has been established. Variables are connected 
by edges, but no markers are added until one can identify the direction of causality. The 
markers are place on one (or both) ends of the edge to indicate the direction of causality.  
When done by hand, this process can be extremely long and tedious. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it is extremely difficult to find the most robust model. 
Therefore, algorithms such as the PC Algorithm used in TETRAD IV are programmed 
to follow these steps and utilize mathematical knowledge to help find the most robust 
model. TETRAD IV begins by building as basic undirected model based on covariance 
and a correlation matrix. It then removes edges between variables in a stepwise fashion 
based on zero correlation or partial correlation until a stable model is reached. While the 
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use of PC Algorithm facilitates the building of the model, the first step is still finding the 
right variables before the mathematics are valid.  
The mathematical framework that follows is specific to DAGs. A DAG 
represents conditional independent relationships by using a basic decomposition scheme 
that utilizes probability theory. First, it is important to understand the concept of 
“Markovian Parents”. Formally defined, Markovian Parents (paj) of a particular variable 
xj are “the minimal set of predecessors of xj that renders xj independent of all its other 
predecessors” (Pearl 2000 pg. 14). In other words, only the parent variables of xj are 
needed to determine its probability. Therefore, we can express the probability for any 
variable xj as  
P(xj | x1, …, xj-1) = P(xj | paj) 
Pearl proves that the conditional independence shown by this equation can be 
expressed exactly by the graphical representations of DAGs. This relationship is known 
as the DAG and probability function being Markov Compatible (Pearl 2000). There are 
three assumptions of DAGs. The first, Markovian Condition (or Parents), has already 
been discussed. The second is the assumption of causal sufficiency. This means that 
there are no omitted variables that cause two or more of the included variables, but as 
discussed earlier there is no way of knowing for certain if this condition has been met. 
The third assumption is the faithfulness condition. This condition simply means that if 
an edge exists between two variables in the final model, then those models do not have 
zero correlation, and in contrast if we do not see an edge between two models it is 
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because they have zero correlation. If these assumptions hold, then the resulting model is 
stable and robust. 
The variables chosen in this study are based on a review of past literature and 
those key characteristics that have been identified as important in the past. The 
background research performed should ensure that the majority of variables have been 
identified; however, there is no way of knowing this for sure. Model specification tests 
will be used in the regression analysis chapter to test for data problems due to the small 
sample and latent variables. There may be other variables that are important in such a 
study, but we feel that the most important ones have been included here. Upon the 
identification of the minimal model, we can then “intervene” in the graph with other 
variables of interest. The most basic model will include financial information and the 
operational information of the firm, such as membership size, average capital 
expenditures, the number of business activities the firm is involved in, and the age of the 
oldest common stock outstanding. This will provide the foundation of the minimal 
model that describes the firms in the sample.  
Then intervening variables are added. Due to the small sample size the 
interventions had to be broken into categories. The categories were based on the major 
themes of the survey, which was based on the past literature review already discussed. 
These themes are competition, strategic planning, equity and equity management, and 
member loyalty. Ideally, all of these factors would be intervening variables in one large 
model, and should this study be repeated in the future and a larger sample size available, 
it would be the logical next step in the process. However, due to the limitations of the 
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data, the best alternative is to make educated deductions as to how they would operate 
when placed together.  
One potential drawback of these graphs is that they do not indicate whether a 
particular variable has a positive or negative impact on another variable, only that it has 
a causal impact on that variable. Given knowledge of the industry and deductive 
reasoning, and educated guess as to whether a variable has a positive or negative impact 
may be made. However, in this case it was felt that there is a need for further expansion 
than human deduction. Furthermore, the number of responses limits the degrees of 
freedom and prevents separate graphs for being run for the successful versus stagnant 
groups. Therefore, regressions were run using the directed graphs as guides. 
3.4 Econometric Analysis  
The regression analysis will be built upon the causal graphs. Due to the 
Markovian Parents Theorem the root causes on the graph can be used as the independent 
variables in the regression, with the sink variables serving as the dependent variables. 
Regressions will be run to determine, first, whether the root positively or negatively 
impacts the sink. Then a second set of regressions will be run to determine the impact of 
performance group on the models.  
Multiple regressions will need to be run for each category due to the graphs 
containing multiple paths. In addition, the graph narrows the variables included in the 
regression because the Markovian Parents theorem tells us that only the parent variables 
are needed to explain a sink variable. For example, the middle link of a causal chain  
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could not be included, because to include such a variable would in essence “block” the 
information flow from the first variable to the third variable. The middle variable of the 
path of interest is a spurious cause if it is included. In addition, multiple roots may be 
present for a single sink. In these cases, those roots would be included as independent 
variables with the sink being the dependent variable, again using Markovian Parents.  
Another consideration in building the regression models is that they must meet 
the back door criterion to assure that the root cause is being used as the independent 
variable rather than a spurious cause. The back door criterion states that a root variable 
can explain a sink variable only when there are no paths through other variables that 
could be taken to get to the sink variable. If there are any such paths, then they must be 
blocked. To accomplish this, a variable on the back door path’s causal chain is included 
in the regression. Just as the middle variable of the path of interest could not be included, 
so the back door variable must be included in order to create an information block. This 
seems counter to logic; however, by blocking the flow of information by that other path, 
the best estimate of the impact of the root variable on the sink variable can be identified.  
Once these regressions have been built, there should be no evidence of 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity due to the procedures followed in building them. If 
such evidence does exist it would signify that there is a problem in either the regression 
model, the directed acyclic graph it was derived from, or in the data itself depending on 
the problem. It would be possible to draw the conclusions gained from regression 
analysis from the graphs alone with sufficient knowledge of all of the factors included; 
however, the regression models reduce the likelihood of human error.  
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In the chapters to follow a presentation of the results and a brief discussion will 
be presented for the statistical analysis of the raw data, the causal graphs, and the 
regression models respectively. The summary and conclusions will follow. The final 
section included in the procedures and methodology chapter will be a presentation of the 
hypotheses to be tested by the analysis.  
3.5 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be evaluated here are only a few of the possibilities that the 
data would allow. A hypothesis was made for each of the major categories and the 
impact the variables in that category would have on performance and the basic model. 
As noted earlier the categories chosen are based on past works and are believed to be 
representative of the issues facing Texas cooperative managers in this new business 
environment.  
It was decided that, since culture was a culmination of all other practices and 
perceptions in a businesses, it did not need to be specifically addressed in the analysis. 
Instead the analyses of the categories can be viewed as a whole to obtain a picture of 
what Texas cooperative culture looks like. Based on these statements, the following 
hypotheses will be evaluated: 
H1: Cooperatives that actively participate in strategic planning will experience greater 
financial performance.  
H2: Cooperatives with a greater understanding of their equity position will experience 
greater financial performance.  
H3: Cooperative performance will be negatively impacted by competition. 
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H4: Cooperatives that value member loyalty will experience greater financial 
performance.  
These hypotheses will be re-visited specifically in Chapter VII, the Summary and 
Conclusions. However, they are addressed indirectly throughout the analysis of this 
study. It is important to understand that these hypotheses come from the past literature, 
and the results of the hypotheses should be in agreement with the literature presented in 
Chapter II. The categories analyzed from this point forward—competition, equity, 
strategic planning, and loyalty—are a direct result of these hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
 
 
This section presents the basic statistical analysis of the raw primary data. An 
understanding of the nature of Texas cooperatives and their general operational structure 
develops the framework needed to design the directed graph models and regressions. 
Section 4.1 deals with the sample as a whole and creates a picture of the average 
cooperative in Texas. Each section is further divided into five sub-sections.  
The first sub-section is a general picture of the financial status and operational 
design of the average cooperative in the sample. The remaining results presentation is 
divided into four sub-section categories that overlap slightly: competition, equity, 
strategic planning and loyalty. Section 4.2 of this discussion presents the group of 
cooperatives deemed successful, or the top performers, and provides a discussion of their 
results in the same format as section 4.1. In addition this section provides some 
comparison to the results of the sample as a whole. The third section, 4.3, follows the 
same procedures as 4.2 for the group of cooperatives deemed stagnant, or the bottom 
performers. The final section, 4.4, is a comparison of the two groups in terms of the 
financial and operational, competition, equity, strategic planning and loyalty framework.  
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 4.1 Statistical Summary for the Sample as a Whole 
The purpose of analyzing the sample as a whole is to understand what the Texas 
cooperative industry looks like in its entirety. The responding cooperatives represent a 
diverse group. This section is looking at each question individually; therefore, there will 
be more responses used here than in other sections where only 100% complete surveys 
were used.  
4.1.1 Cooperative Operational and Financial Overview 
Responding cooperatives reported an average net savings of $1.2 million, but this 
number was highly variable. Profit margin for the average cooperative is 11.2%. 
Average membership size was 883 members and a board made up of 9 members. The 
average cooperative is of a medium size, with an average 3 locations of operation 
including the primary location. Of the total responding group, 54% reported operating in 
just one primary location with no satellite locations. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the 
financial profile of the average cooperative.  
The current assets item includes $796,991 in accounts receivables. Current ratio 
is 2.11, compared to the benchmark values of 1.5 for supply cooperatives and 2.0 for 
grain cooperatives. Average capital expenditures over two historical years, the current 
year (2004), and one estimated year is $327,084. Working capital of the average 
cooperative is $1,797,125 and it has a net working capital ratio of 28.74%. The average 
equity to assets ratio is 61%, a healthy margin above the benchmark of 50%, and the 
return on assets ratio is 12%, which is again well exceeding the 8% benchmark. 
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Table 1: Financial Profile of the Average Cooperative 
 Number 
Observations 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Current Assets 40 $ 3,421,408 4,181,922 
Fixed Assets 40 $2,419,508 3,181,840 
Current Liabilities 41 $1,624,283 1,758,736 
Long Term Liabilities 41 $596,279 1,228,135 
Retained Earnings 39 $952,156 1,991,888 
Stockholder and Patron 
Equity 
41 $4,004,097 5,236,434 
Sales 39 $10,979,364 14,223,400 
COGS* 38 $7,585,841 11,155,958 
Gross Margin 40 $2,763,717 4,003,110 
Total Expenses 39 $2,855,921 4,168,369 
Net Savings 40 $1,229,746 2,642,248 
Active Membership 41 883 2,047 
Board Size 42 9 8 
Average Number of 
Branches ** 
19 2 2 
% Retained 32 24% .29 
Capital Expenditures 2002 32 $219,466 442,893 
2003 35 $252,708 450,559 
2004 34 $245,484 298,934 
2005 (estimate) 31 $590,677 2,315,200 
* Cost of Goods Sold 
** The question asks for the number of branches outside of the primary location of the 
company 
 
 
 
The debt to equity ratio is 62.32%, which is fairly high for a cooperative but still 
below the benchmark of less than 70%. Cash dividend payout ratio is 67.45%, which is 
higher than the peer average of 20%. (All benchmarks are courtesy of Jason Lawrence, 
CoBank). The average cooperative is a financially healthy company that should thrive 
well into the future.  
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the type of business activities that these 
companies are involved in. Although the “other” category represents a significant 
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portion of the answers, no detail can be provided on the type of cooperative that is in this 
category due to the sensitivity of the information.  Some cooperatives are involved in 
more than one activity. Of the population sample, the average cooperative is involved in 
two of these business activities.  
The remainder of the analysis on the cooperative as a whole will be divided into 
the four categories of competition, equity, strategic planning, and loyalty.  
 
 
Table 2: Business Activity Participation 
 Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Grain Handling and Storage 46 30% .47 
Fertilizer and Chemical 
Sales 
46 46% .50 
Fuel or Tires 46 30% .47 
Rice Handling and Storage 46 2% .15 
Cotton Ginning 46 50% .51 
Application Services 46 13% .34 
Feed and Livestock Supplies 46 30% .47 
Commodity Marketing 46 7% .25 
Other 46 24% .43 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Competition 
As previously noted, competition has been proven as a key factor in the 
performance of cooperatives. The role of cooperatives in the competitive environment 
has varied historically, the two most prominent theories being written by Edwin Nourse 
and Aaron Sapiro. Nourse provided the competitive yardstick theory, in which 
cooperatives existed only when competition was weak and, by their nature as a not for 
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profit organization, they forced an oligopoly or monopoly to be more competitive. 
Nourse felt that cooperatives had no place in a competitive market; therefore, once 
competition had been established they should either dissolve or transform into an IOF.  
By contrast, Sapiro theorized that cooperatives play a vital role in a competitive 
environment and are created to give power to small producers. He felt this was a valid 
purpose, no matter what the competitive situation of the firm. The only reason a 
cooperative should dissolve or transform into an IOF is if it is the best possible decision 
for the benefit of their small producer members (Barton 1989). There is no doubt that 
both of these cooperative researchers could find application for their theory today. 
Nourse’s competitive yardstick was created for the Midwestern supply and elevator 
cooperatives, while Sapiro had the California produce cooperatives in mind. It is 
probable that given any individual situation, a particular theory is more applicable than 
the other. Through the analysis of the competitive situation, it is hoped that some 
generalization may be made on Texas cooperatives.   
The questions dealing with competition in the survey deal with both direct, 
tangible issues such as the number of competitors as well as intangible perceptions of 
management as to their place in the competitive environment. The first query concerned 
the competitive situation the firm was involved in. This was accomplished through a 
series of four questions in which the manager was asked to list the total number of 
business rivals, the number of cooperative business rivals, the number of national chain 
business rivals, and the number of internet rivals that they compete closely with. This 
leaves the remainder of the total rivals as anything not falling into those other categories. 
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The average cooperative competes with five total rivals, who are broken down into two 
cooperative rivals, one national chain rival and one internet rival, so one rival does not 
lie in these categories.  
The second query involved perceptions by managers about what factors had the 
greatest impact on the company’s ability to compete with their closest rival. They were 
asked to choose the three most influential factors since it possible that many factors can 
impact the competitiveness of any one firm. The data was entered as dummy variables 
with one denoting that the factor in question has a great impact on the company’s ability 
to compete and zero denoting that it does not. Managers overwhelmingly (69%) felt that 
member loyalty was one of the most important factors. This was followed by pricing 
policies (49%) and the number of competitors (40%). The remaining answers were 
distributed as listed in Table 3.  
Through the use of the likert scale, the final two questions involving competition 
ask the manager whether he/she agrees or not to a set of statements, with an answer of 
“5” signifying that the manager strongly agrees with the statement, a “3” signifying 
indecision, and a “1” signifying that the manager strongly disagrees with the statement. 
The first statement was, “My company is a leading competitor among its rivals.” On 
average, the respondents “agreed” with this statement by answering with a 4 on the 
scale. This question had a standard deviation of .86.  
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Table 3: Factors Impacting the Cooperative’s Ability to Compete with Their 
Closest Rivals 
 Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cost Structure 45 24% .43 
Employee Expertise 45 27% .45 
Government Policies 44 7% .25 
Internet and Technology Utilization 45 2% .15 
Laws Unique to Cooperative 
Businesses 
45 0% .00 
Leadership Experience 45 13% .34 
Location of the Company 45 24% .43 
Member Loyalty 45 69% .47 
Number of Competitors 45 40% .50 
Pricing Policies 45 49% .51 
Strategic Planning 45 11% .32 
Technological Advances 45 4% .21 
Unique Service/ Product Offering 45 9% .29 
Other 45 7% .25 
 
 
The second such likert scale question is an overlapping question with the loyalty 
category. It asks managers, on the same scale as above, to answer to the statement, 
“Identifying the top 25 current and potential customers is key.” Managers generally 
“agreed” with this statement as well; in addition, when asked (by dummy variable) 
whether or not they actually identify their top 25 customers 28% of respondents identify 
only and 33% identify them as well as taking specific steps to retain them as future 
customers.  
4.1.3 Equity 
The equity account is important in any business, but it is particularly important in 
cooperatives. Cooperative equity is what gives the investor ownership rights in the 
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business, which for cooperatives means voting rights and a say in company policy, in 
addition to the usual dividend claims on the business. There is no law defining how 
much equity a cooperative must pay back in each year, if any at all. Therefore, 
cooperatives often do not redeem equity, even in a profitable year. Even those 
cooperatives that have a specific section in their bylaws defining their equity redemption 
policy are not obligated to redeem unless the cooperative can financially support it. 
Some cooperatives will chose to retain earnings or give a larger dividend rather than 
redeem equity in a profitable year. It is hoped that this study will discover the 
redemption habits of cooperatives in Texas and whether they differ between successful 
and stagnant cooperatives.   
Survey respondents reported the type of redemption policy used by their 
company, or that they had no redemption policy. There was also an “other” option to 
report a different type of policy than those listed. In the literature these are called special 
situation redemption plans (Cobia, Royer, and Ingalsbe 1989). The most predominant 
policy type in Texas is a revolving fund equity redemption policy, which is a “first in, 
first out” policy. Under this plan, the oldest stock gets redeemed first. What this means 
for members, is that those who have been members of the cooperative for a longer 
period of time will get their equity back before those who have been there a shorter 
period of time. This plan is utilized by 41% of respondents.  
The least used plan was the percentage of all equities policy, which involves the 
cooperative retiring a defined percentage of total equity in each year, regardless of the 
age of equity. The benefit of this policy is that it gives almost instant reward to new 
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members; however, the downfall is that over-invested members will probably remain 
over-invested because the cooperative cannot pay their equity down in large amounts 
under this plan. Percentage of all equities accounts for only 5% of respondents.  
The final policy option was for the base capital equity redemption plan, in which 
the company has a base number of years after which they either redeem equity or ask for 
additional equity depending on the individual. When a farmer is over-invested, the 
company would redeem the amount of equity above his/her fair portion of investment 
during the base period. If the farmer is under-invested, the company will require an 
investment of equity to bring him/her up to the fair portion of investment during the base 
period.  Although this policy is the most equitable because it links investment with 
redemption, it accounted for only 7% of respondents. In addition, 2% of respondents 
reported some other form of “special situation” policy. Of particular interest is that 48% 
of respondents reported having no formal equity redemption policy. The company was 
asked to share the age of the oldest outstanding stock that the cooperative had on the 
books. On average the oldest stock was 18 years old, with a standard deviation of 20.  
There were other questions relating to equity as well. When questioned on topics 
that will help the cooperative prepare for future challenges, 52% of respondents chose 
“balancing dividend payments and equity redemption” as one of their top five topics. 
The same question also included the topic, “understanding and analyzing financial 
information”, which was chosen by only 17% of the survey respondents. The equity 
management and perceptions of equity by managers in this category appear to as one 
would expect from a review of the literature on the subject.  
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4.1.4 Strategic Planning 
Strategic planning has been touted as a way for cooperatives to identify their 
company’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as future opportunities and outside threats 
to the company. Cooperatives are encouraged to seek alternative avenues and structure 
short and long term plans for the future of the company. In a strategic planning retreat 
companies will review their mission and vision, as well as consider any changes that 
need to be made to policies and bylaws in order to achieve the company objectives. It is 
hoped that through the strategic planning process cooperatives can become stronger and 
more efficient, as well as identify growth and expansion activities. Or they might 
discover that they need to “tighten their belts” and downsize the company. In any case, 
the goal of strategic planning is clear, if only cooperatives utilize it to the fullest 
potential. The survey asked specifically for practices and perceptions in strategic 
planning. In addition it questions managers on what literature suggests as the “results” of 
strategic planning—efficiency, diversity and growth.  
The first question in this section dealt with the initiatives the company had 
toward future growth. The question had five possible options plus the “other” option, 
where they could enter their own personal response. The five possibilities were to raise 
margin levels, expand volume in current lines of business, cut costs, and sell assets. The 
most responses (61%) were in favor of expanding current lines of business followed by a 
much closer decision to raise margin levels (28%), cut costs (22%), and develop new 
lines of business (20%). The final option, selling assets had a zero response rate. The 
other category accounted for 7% of respondents.  
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When questioned as to the greatest contributor to operational efficiency in the 
company, managers were offered four choices as well as the option to write in an “other” 
contributor. The four options available were centralization of services, reduction of 
redundant labor, utilization of advanced technology, and training of personnel. The 
greatest contributor was the training of personnel at 36% of respondents, followed by 
centralized services at 29%, reduction of redundant labor at 22% and utilization of 
advanced technology at 16%. The option of some other contributor was chosen by 4% of 
respondents.  
When questioned as to what diversification method would be most likely to 
succeed, four options were available plus the option to include an “other” answer. The 
four options were: to introduce new departments within the company, to participate in 
joint ventures with other cooperatives, to participate in joint ventures with other non-
cooperatives, and to provide expanded services within the existing departments. The 
greatest response was to provide expanded services within the existing departments, 
which made up 47% of responses. This was followed by participation in joint ventures 
with other cooperatives, with 33% of responses, and introduction of new departments 
within the company with 16% of responses. The “other” category made up 11% of the 
total responses. The “other” answers seem to convey a sense that many cooperatives feel 
there is no need to diversify and that they plan to instead concentrate of efficiency. The 
lowest response group at 9% was for participation in joint ventures with non-
cooperatives.  
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The final question related to topics that cooperatives feel will help them prepare 
for future challenges, 67% chose strategic planning as one of their top five choices. 
When questioned (on the likert scale of 5 being “strongly agree” and 1 being “strongly 
disagree”) managers “agree” to the statement, “it is important to the success of my 
company to have a long run strategic plan” with an average ranking of 4. However, 
managers are not as positive about the statement “our company’s strategic plan is 
reviewed and potentially revised at least annually.” Managers were “undecided” about 
this statement.  
On the more operational side, cooperative managers “agree” with the statements 
“my current financial position will allow for future growth and expansion” and “my 
company is operationally efficient enough to sustain growth and expansion.” The 
average on both questions was 4, but the standard deviations vary with a 1.05 std. dev. 
on the former and .82 std. dev. on the latter.  
4.1.5 Loyalty 
Member loyalty is a complex issue, particularly for cooperatives. Some measure 
member loyalty through dollar sales done with the business, some through their 
involvement in the business, but none agree as to an efficient way to measure something 
so variable and individual to the person. In this case, rather than trying to measure 
loyalty directly, the survey asked for a report of the change in membership size and the 
manager’s perceptions on of the loyalty of their own members. It is probable that this 
perception is not entirely accurate; however, the goal of this sub-section is not to 
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ascertain the true state of members’ loyalty but to ascertain the impact that the 
manager’s perception of loyalty has on the performance of the business.  
The active membership trend is reported in Table 4. The majority of cooperative 
managers felt that their memberships have stayed the same, with a somewhat normal 
distribution on each side.  
 
 
Table 4: Active Membership Trend in the Last Five Years 
Membership Size Trend … Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increased 25% or More 45 4% .21 
Increased 11-15% 45 7% .25 
Increased 10% or Less 45 20% .40 
Stayed the Same 45 38% .49 
Decreased 10% or Less 45 20% .40 
Decreased 11-15% 45 9% .29 
Decreased 25% or More 45 2% .15 
 
 
The remainder of the questions in this category deal with the manager’s 
perceptions of loyalty in his/her own cooperative. The first questions relating to this 
topic deal with how critical the financial condition of members and improving member 
services are to the cooperative. This was a likert scale question with 5 signifying “very 
critical”, 3 signifying “neutrality”, and 1 signifying “not critical”. Managers felt that the 
financial condition of members is a “critical” issue for the cooperatives; similarly, they 
felt that improving member services is “critical” as well. In an overlapping question with 
the competition category, 69% of managers (the largest percentage of the options) felt 
that member loyalty was critical to the cooperative’s ability to compete.  
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The final group of questions was aimed at ascertaining the manager’s perceptions 
of the impact of various factors on member loyalty through the use of a likert scale 
where five equals “strongly agree”, three signifies “uncertain” and one signifies 
“strongly disagree”. The questionnaire asked for perceptions on five factors, which were: 
professional expertise of staff, confidence in the general manager, confidence in the 
board of directors, the level of community involvement, and customer service.  
Managers “agreed” that all of these factors greatly impact member loyalty by ranking all 
of them at an average 4. When questioned whether cooperatives are losing large farmers 
as customers and members, managers “disagree” (2). Finally, when questioned whether 
it is essential to educate members of the operational decisions of the company, managers 
“agree” with an average of 4. 
4.2 Statistical Summary for the Sample Group: Top Performers 
The successful group, or top performers, is made up of the cooperatives which 
exceeded acceptable levels of both ROA and E/A. There are 18 cooperatives that sorted 
into this group. The purpose of analyzing the statistics of this group separately is to have 
a basis of comparison against the bottom performers so that further analysis can be done 
to ascertain the differences between the two groups and to provide a comparison against 
the average.  
4.2.1 Cooperative Operational and Financial Overview 
Cooperatives in this group had an average net income of $2.4 million, as well as 
an average ROA of 25% and an E/A of 70%. These strong numbers signify that these 
cooperatives are viable financially currently and into the future. The current ratio is 2.33, 
 
50 
which is well above the benchmark. Profit margin is 14.03% for the cooperatives in this 
category. The average operational structure in this group is a cooperative averaging $17 
million in sales, with one main location and one branch office. Active membership is 
1443 members with an average board size of 12 members. This is considerably larger 
than the average of the sample as a whole. Working capital for these cooperatives is 
$2,864,335 and the net working capital is 32.84%. Debt to Equity is 41.13%, which is 
more acceptable than the sample as a whole. Dividend payout is 64%, which is lower 
than the average, but still considerable when the comparative increase in net income is 
taken into account. Overall, the top performer cooperative is larger in size and slightly 
higher performing than the average of the sample as a whole. Table 5 outlines the basic 
profile of the average top performer.  
The largest numbers of cooperatives in this group were cotton gins or some 
specialization (respondent marked “other” as their primary business activity). Cotton 
gins accounted for 50% of responses and “others” accounted for 39%. The average 
cooperative in this group was involved in two business activities. Table 6 below lists the 
remaining cooperatives business participation and the standard deviation of the variable. 
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Table 5: Financial Profile of the Average Top Performer Cooperative 
 Number  
Observations
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Current Assets 18 $5,018,787 5,416,192 
Fixed Assets 18 $2,901,568 3,359,196 
Current Liabilities 18 $2,154,452 2,070,530 
Long Term Liabilities 18 $306,539 695,702 
Retained Earnings 18 $1,509,612 2,792,441 
Stockholder and Patron Equity 18 $6,260,467 6,831,347 
Sales 17 $17,270,320 19,128,765 
COGS* 16 $11,425,704 15,805,750 
Gross Margin 17 $4,528,725 5,428,725 
Total Expenses 17 $4,726,904 5,753,385 
Net Savings 18 $2,423,674 3,440,018 
Active Membership 18 1443 2,939 
Board Size 18 12 11 
Average Number of Branches ** 8 1 1 
% Retained 15 28% .28 
Capital Expenditures 2002 12 $685,309 685,309 
2003 14 $687,771 687,770 
2004 15 $377,493 377,492 
2005 (estimate) 13 $327,805 327,805 
*Cost of Goods Sold 
** The question asks for the number of branches outside of the primary location of the 
company 
 
 
 
Table 6: Business Activity Participation: Top Performer 
 Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Grain Handling and Storage 18 11% .32 
Fertilizer and Chemical Sales 18 28% .46 
Fuel or Tires 18 6% .24 
Rice Handling and Storage 18 0% 0 
Cotton Ginning 18 50% .51 
Application Services 18 17% .38 
Feed and Livestock Supplies 18 22% .43 
Commodity Marketing 18 6% .24 
Other 18 39% .50 
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4.2.2 Competition 
The competitive situation of the top performers appears to run closely to the 
sample averages reported earlier. The cooperatives face an average 5 closest 
competitors, with 2 competitors being cooperatives, 2 being national chains, and one 
being internet based. Particularly because of the size of these companies, it seems 
reasonable that there would be more national chain competitors than the average. The 
number only increases by one; however, depending on the size of the company and/or 
the size of the national chain store, the impact could range in intensity.  
When looking at the responses of this group in particular for the question related 
to the factors that impact the cooperative’s ability to compete, one sees that the results 
are similar to the sample as a whole. The only real difference is the jump in “employee 
expertise” as one of the most important factors. The other variable that increased 
significantly is the importance of a unique product or service. The answers for the 
sample as a whole and for the top performer subgroup are similar in that member 
loyalty, number of competitors and pricing policies remain top factors. Table 7 provides 
an overview of these answers and others in the top performer subgroup.  
When analyzing the two likert scale questions regarding competition, the first 
question, “My company is a leading competitor among its rivals” is met more 
confidently than the sample as a whole. Top performer cooperatives “strongly agreed” 
(5) to this statement compared to the sample as a whole who “agreed”. The second 
question on likert scale did not change from the sample as a whole. When asked 
“Identifying my top 25 current and potential customers is key” cooperatives “agreed” 
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with the statement,. Overall, successful cooperatives appear to be in a slightly more 
competitive situation, but are confident in their role in that environment, leaning more 
toward the Sapiro school of competitive thought.  
 
 
Table 7: Factors Impacting the Top Performer Cooperative’s Ability to Compete 
with Their Closest Rivals 
 Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cost Structure 17 18% .39 
Employee Expertise 17 41% .51 
Government Policies 17 6% .24 
Internet and Technology Utilization 17 0% .00 
Laws Unique to Cooperative 
Businesses 
17 0% .00 
Leadership Experience 17 18% .39 
Location of the Company 17 18% .39 
Member Loyalty 17 71% .47 
Number of Competitors 17 41% .51 
Pricing Policies 17 47% .51 
Strategic Planning 17 12% .33 
Technological Advances 17 6% .24 
Unique Service/ Product Offering 17 18% .39 
Other 17 0% .00 
 
 
4.2.3 Equity 
The equity situation of the successful group follows a similar pattern as the 
sample as a whole. The revolving fund equity redemption policy is utilized by 61% of 
respondents. This is similar to the sample as a whole, but it is used by 20% more 
respondents in the top performer group. The base capital equity redemption policy is still 
the second most used at 6%, only one percent less than the sample as a whole. The 
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percentage of all equities policy is not used by this group. In addition, no cooperatives in 
this group need the use of a special situations equity redemption policy. The respondents 
who have no equity redemption policy dropped from 48% in the sample as a whole to 
only 33% in the top performer subgroup.   
Of the managers who are seeking additional help to prepare for future challenges, 
44% of respondents chose “balancing dividend payments and equity redemption” as one 
of their top five topics. This is an 8% reduction from the sample as a whole. The same 
question also included the topic, “understanding and analyzing financial information”, 
which was chosen by only 17% of the survey respondents. This is the exact percentage 
of respondents to this question in the sample as a whole.  
4.2.4 Strategic Planning 
Since these cooperatives are deemed to be successful and viable on the long term 
(as signified by their E/A ratio exceeding 50%) it is logical that, if strategic planning has 
a significant impact on success, efficiency and long term viability these cooperatives 
should be participating in strategic planning or at least recognize it as valuable. The first 
question in this section dealt with the initiatives the company had toward future growth. 
Over the five possibilities, this group followed closely with the sample as a whole. In 
response to the option of raising margin levels, 22% felt that this was the best initiative 
to take. This is a 6% reduction from the sample as a whole. The same percentage of 
respondents chose the option of developing new lines of business (22%), this was a 2% 
increase from the sample as a whole. The most popular response was still to expand 
volume in current lines of business, to which 67% of those surveyed responded. This is a 
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6% increase from the sample as a whole. Cutting costs accounted for 11% of responses, 
dropping a spot in the ranked order and declining 11% from the sample as a whole. The 
final option of selling assets of course had a zero response rate. The other category 
accounted for 6% of respondents.  
When questioned as to the greatest contributor to operational efficiency in the 
company, top performer cooperative managers felt that the greatest contributor was a tie 
between the training of personnel and centralized services at 33% each. The reduction of 
redundant labor and the utilization of advanced technology also accounted for the same 
number of responses at 17% each. The option of some other contributor was chosen by 
6% of respondents, which is up from 4% in the sample as a whole.  
When questioned as to what diversification method would be most likely to 
succeed, the greatest response was still to provide expanded services within the existing 
departments, which made up 44% of responses. This is down by 5% from the sample as 
a whole. The second most popular diversification method among the top performers was 
participation in joint ventures with other cooperatives, with 28% of responses (down 
from 33%). This is followed by a tie between the introduction of new departments within 
the company and “other” answers at 22% of responses. Written answers to the “other” 
option seem to convey a sense that many cooperatives feel there is no need to diversify 
and that they plan to instead concentrate on efficiency. The lowest response group at 6% 
was for participation in joint ventures with non-cooperatives.  
The final questions relating to strategic planning were on the topics that 
cooperatives feel will help them prepare for future challenges. In this subgroup 83% 
 
56 
chose strategic planning as one of their top five choices. This is up 16% from the sample 
as a whole. When questioned (on the likert scale of 5 being “strongly agree” and 1 being 
“strongly disagree”) managers again “agree” to the statement, “it is important to the 
success of my company to have a long run strategic plan” with an average ranking of 4. 
This is the same as in the sample as a whole. The similarity to the sample as a whole 
continues as top performer managers are “undecided” (3) about the statement “our 
company’s strategic plan is reviewed and potentially revised at least annually.”  
On the more operational side, cooperative managers “agree” with the statements 
“my current financial position will allow for future growth and expansion” and “my 
company is operationally efficient enough to sustain growth and expansion.” The 
average on both questions was 4, which is the same as the sample as a whole. However, 
the standard deviations go down somewhat for the former to .96 from 1.05 and go up 
slightly for the latter question from .82 to .84 respectively.  
4.2.5 Loyalty 
The top performer group has more members than the sample as a whole. The 
members of this group have an average 1883 members, and the range is from a 
minimum of one to a maximum of 10,000 members. Both of these outliers are regional 
cooperatives. It is unknown if this larger average member size impacts the number of 
loyalty related issues the cooperative faces. The active membership trend is reported in 
Table 8. One of the responding cooperatives that sorted into this group did not complete 
this question. The majority of cooperative managers felt that their memberships have 
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stayed the same, with a somewhat normal distribution on each side, similar to the sample 
as a whole.  
 
 
Table 8: Active Membership Trend for the Top Performers in the Last Five Years 
Membership Size Trend Number of 
Observation
Number of 
Reponses 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increased 25% or More 17 1 6% .24 
Increased 11-15% 17 1 6% .24 
Increased 10% or Less 17 3 18% .39 
Stayed the Same 17 6 35% .49 
Decreased 10% or Less 17 3 18% .39 
Decreased 11-15% 17 2 12% .33 
Decreased 25% or More 17 1 6% .24 
 
 
The remainder of the questions in this category deal with the manager’s 
perceptions of loyalty in his/her own cooperative. The first questions deal with how 
critical the financial condition of members and improving member services are to the 
cooperative. This is based on a likert scale with 5 signifying “very critical”, 3 signifying 
“neutral”, and 1 signifying “not critical”. Managers felt that the financial condition of 
members is a “critical” issue for the cooperative; similarly, they felt that improving 
member services is “critical”. This is the same as the sample as a whole. In an 
overlapping question with the competition category, 71% of managers (the largest 
percentage of the options) felt that member loyalty was critical to the cooperative’s 
ability to compete. This is up slightly (2%) from the sample as a whole.  
The final group of questions was aimed at ascertaining the manager’s perceptions 
of the impact of various factors on member loyalty through the use of a likert scale 
 
58 
where five equals “strongly agree”, three signifies “uncertain” and one signifies 
“strongly disagree”. The five factors, of professional expertise of staff, confidence in the 
general manager, confidence in the board of directors, the level of community 
involvement, and customer service were rated the same as the sample as a whole with 
one exception, customer service.  Managers “agreed” with the first four by ranking them 
at an average 4. However, managers “strongly agreed” that customer service greatly 
impacts member loyalty (5).  
When questioned whether cooperatives are losing large farmers as customers and 
members, managers disagree (2) just as in the analysis of the sample as a whole. 
Similarly, when questioned whether it is essential to educate members on the operational 
decisions of the company, top performer managers agree with an average of 4. Overall, 
the top performer group is very similar to the sample as a whole, with only slightly more 
positive responses in most cases. The following section will perform a similar analysis 
with the bottom performing group.  
4.3 Statistical Summary for the Sample Group: Bottom Performers 
The bottom performers, or the stagnant group, are those cooperatives that failed 
to meet the benchmark standards in both ROA and E/A. Only six cooperatives sorted 
into this category making it difficult to make any sound conclusions from this group; 
however, this information will still be presented for the sake of comparison.  
4.3.1 Cooperative Operational and Financial Overview 
Cooperatives in this group had an average net income of negative $170,391 as 
well as an average ROA of negative 6% and an E/A of 33%. Profit margin was negative 
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3.57%. Just as troubling, the debt to equity ratio is 143.79%. As these numbers signify, 
the cooperatives in this group, however few, are in a serious situation. The average 
operational structure in this group is a cooperative averaging $4.8 million in sales, with 
one main location and four branch offices. However, since only two cooperatives 
responded as having branch offices at all, it is unlikely that this average is representative 
of the population.  
The current ratio is 1.77, barely making the benchmark for a supply cooperative 
and under the mark for a grain supply company. Active membership is 840 members 
with an average board size of 8 members. This is closer to the numbers obtained from 
the sample as a whole than the top performers. The average working capital is $711,737 
with a net working capital of 26.58%. An interesting note is on the amount of earnings 
retained from net savings every year. These cooperatives are retaining an average 65% 
of their net earnings every year, which appears to signify a dedication to building up the 
business. Their small net earnings amounts (if they are even positive) appear to be 
preventing this. The retained earnings account is about one third the size of the retained 
earnings account for the sample as a whole. The average company paid out no dividends 
in 2004. Table 9 outlines the average bottom performer in this sample.  
The largest numbers of cooperatives in this group were involved in farm supply 
and services including fertilizer and chemical sales, fuel or tires, grain handling and 
storage, and feed and livestock supplies. The average cooperative in this group was 
involved in three business activities. The percentage of cotton gins was reduced to 17% 
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as compared to the top performers which had 50% cotton gins. Table 10 below lists the 
remaining cooperatives business participation and the standard deviation of the variable.  
 
Table 9: Financial Profile of the Average Bottom Performing Cooperative 
 Number 
Observations
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Current Assets 6 $1,637,761 1,579,270 
Fixed Assets 6 $742,949 567,037 
Current Liabilities 6 $926,024 950,724 
Long Term Liabilities 6 $573,862 369,997 
Retained Earnings 6 $326,361 397,211 
Stockholder and Patron Equity 6 $1,050,281 853,176 
Sales 6 $4,775,268 3,665,931 
COGS* 6 $4,283,704 3,292,816 
Gross Margin 6 $712,903 811,449 
Total Expenses 6 $1,121,233 648,227 
Net Savings 6 $-170,391 204,714 
Active Membership 6 840 1320 
Board Size 6 8 2 
Average Number of Branches ** 2 4 3 
% Retained 4 65% 47% 
Capital Expenditures 2002 6 $71,266 94,743 
2003 6 $177,381 190,515 
2004 6 $67,500 59,644 
2005 (estimate) 6 $97,667 70,941 
* Cost of Goods Sold  
** The question asks for the number of branches outside of the primary location of the 
company 
 
 
 
Table 10: Business Activity Participation: Bottom Performers 
 Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Grain Handling and Storage 6 33% .52 
Fertilizer and Chemical Sales 6 83% .41 
Fuel or Tires 6 50% .55 
Rice Handling and Storage 6 17% .41 
Cotton Ginning 6 17% .41 
Application Services 6 0% 0 
Feed and Livestock Supplies 6 33% .52 
Commodity Marketing 6 0% 0 
Other 6 17% .41 
 
61 
4.3.2 Competition 
The competitive environment in which these cooperative operate is likely more 
difficult than the average cooperative in the sample, and most likely more difficult than 
in the top performer group. This is illustrated both in the number of competitors as well 
as the manager’s perception of the number of competitors on the cooperative. The total 
rivals of the cooperative goes up in comparison to the sample as a whole. The average 
bottom performer has a total nine close rivals, of which two are cooperative rivals, three 
are national chain rivals and two are internet rivals. The only number which stayed the 
same from the sample in its entirety is the number of cooperative competitors. It is 
possible that the managers of these smaller cooperatives that are in more difficult 
financial situations feel that more competitors are “close rivals” than those cooperatives 
in other groups.  
Another way in which the more difficult competitive situation is illustrated 
would be in the responses concerning the factors that have the greatest impact on the 
cooperative’s ability to compete with their closest rivals. The most frequently chosen 
factor at 67% of responses is the number of competitors being one of the top three 
factors. Rounding out the top three are pricing policies and the location of the company. 
An overview of the ranking of these factors and the other possibilities are shown in 
Table 11.  
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Table 11: Factors Impacting the Bottom Performer Cooperative’s Ability to 
Compete with Their Closest Rivals 
 Number of 
Observation
Number of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cost Structure 6 1 17% .41 
Employee Expertise 6 1 17% .41 
Government Policies 6 2 33% .52 
Internet and Technology 
Utilization 
6 1 17% .41 
Laws Unique to 
Cooperative Businesses 
6 0 0% 0 
Leadership Experience 6 0 0% 0 
Location of the Company 6 3 50% .55 
Member Loyalty 6 2 33% .52 
Number of Competitors 6 4 67% .52 
Pricing Policies 6 3 50% .55 
Strategic Planning 6 1 17% .41 
Technological Advances 6 0 0% 0 
Unique Service/ Product 
Offering 
6 0 0% 0 
Other 6 0 0% 0 
 
 
 
In contrast to their seemingly weaker competitive situation, managers still 
maintained a positive outlook on their role in the market area. When analyzing the two 
likert scale questions regarding competition, the first question, “My company is a 
leading competitor among its rivals”, managers agree to this statement by answering an 
average of 4. This is the same as the sample as a whole. The second question on likert 
scale did not change from the sample as a whole either. When asked whether 
“Identifying my top 25 current and potential customers is key” cooperatives “agreed” 
with the statement. Overall, stagnant cooperatives appear to be in a more difficult 
competitive situation, but they are maintaining a positive outlook on the situation.  
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4.3.3 Equity 
Equity was expected to be a difficult issue for these cooperatives because it is 
unlikely that they would be able to redeem equity in many years given that they are 
following the pattern seen the in the sample year and making little money if any at all. 
Therefore, we would expect that these cooperatives will not be as active in their equity 
redemption policies and attitudes as the sample as a whole or their top performer 
counterparts.  
This is illustrated by the response to the question asking managers to identify 
their formal equity redemption policy, which has the options of revolving fund equity 
policy, base capital equity policy, percentage of all equities policy or a special situations 
equity policy. None of the cooperatives in this group utilized any of these formal equity 
redemption policies. The respondents unanimously chose the option of having “no 
formal equity redemption plan”.  
The equity situation as noted in section 4.3.1 is that the average amount of 
stockholder and patron equity held by the cooperative is just over $1 million and the age 
of the oldest stock is 28 years. Of the managers who are seeking additional help to 
prepare for future challenges, 50% of respondents chose “balancing dividend payments 
and equity redemption” as one of their top five topics. This is a 2% reduction from the 
sample as a whole. The same question also included the topic, “understanding and 
analyzing financial information”, which was chosen by 17% of the survey respondents. 
This is the exact percentage of respondents to this question in the sample as a whole.  
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4.3.4 Strategic Planning 
It is hoped that these cooperatives are at least interested in learning more about 
strategic planning if they are not already participating in it. The first question in this 
section dealt with the initiatives the company had toward future growth. Over the five 
possibilities this group was more interested in expansionary initiatives rather than cutting 
costs or selling assets. In response to the option of raising margin levels, 17% felt that 
this was the best initiative to take. This is an 11% reduction from the sample as a whole. 
The same percentage of respondents chose the option of developing new lines of 
business (17%). The most popular response was still to expand volume in current lines 
of business, which accounted for 67% of those surveyed. Cutting costs accounted for 
17% of responses. The final option of selling assets of course had a zero response rate 
and the “other” option had a zero percent response as well.  
When questioned as to the greatest contributor to operational efficiency in the 
company, bottom performer cooperative managers felt that the greatest contributor was 
reduction of redundant personnel, which accounted for 67% of total responses. 
Centralization of services was the second most popular answer with 33% of responses 
followed by the training of personnel at 17% and “other” answers, also at 17%. The 
option of utilizing advanced technology was chosen by none of the cooperatives in this 
sample subgroup.  
When questioned as to what diversification method would be most likely to 
succeed, the greatest response was still to provide expanded services within the existing 
departments, which made up 50% of responses. This is up 3% from the sample as a 
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whole. The second most popular diversification method among the bottom performers 
was participation in joint ventures with other cooperatives, with 33% of responses. This 
was followed by 17% of managers choosing to participate in joint ventures with non-
cooperatives. None of the managers in this category chose the option of introducing new 
departments within the company; however, this is not a surprising result considering that 
these companies averaged 3 primary business departments already established in their 
business. Neither did any of these managers choose to fill in an “other” response.  
When questioned on the topics that cooperatives feel will help them prepare for 
future challenges, 67% chose strategic planning as one of their top five choices. This is 
the same as the sample as a whole. When questioned (on the likert scale of 5 being 
“strongly agree” and 1 being “strongly disagree”) managers again “agree” to the 
statement, “it is important to the success of my company to have a long run strategic 
plan” with an average ranking of 4. Bottom performer managers are “undecided” (3) 
about the statement “our company’s strategic plan is reviewed and potentially revised at 
least annually.” Both of these rankings are the same as the sample as a whole.  
On the more operational side, cooperative managers are “undecided” with the 
statements “my current financial position will allow for future growth and expansion” 
but “agree” with the statement “my company is operationally efficient enough to sustain 
growth and expansion.” The sample as a whole had an average response of “agree” on 
both of these statements. The standard deviation goes up for the former to 1.37 from 
1.05 and goes up for the latter question from .82 to .89. It is not unexpected that 
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managers would be undecided on whether their current position would allow for future 
growth and expansion considering the financial position discussed in section 4.3.1. 
4.3.5 Loyalty 
The bottom performers do not have as large an average membership as the top 
performers, and therefore it is possible that member loyalty is either a much larger issue 
or a much smaller issue for them. The membership trend of the bottom performers is 
much more stagnant than the sample as a whole, with very little movement. What 
movement was seen tended to be more in the “decreasing” trend than in the “increasing” 
trend. Table 12 provides a breakdown of the active membership trend of the bottom 
performers in the last five years.  
 
 
Table 12: Active Membership Trend for the Bottom Performers in the Last Five 
Years 
Membership Size Trend Number of 
Observation 
Average % of 
Businesses 
Involved 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increased 25% or More 6 0% .00 
Increased 11-15% 6 0% .00 
Increased 10% or Less 6 17% .41 
Stayed the Same 6 50% .55 
Decreased 10% or Less 6 17% .41 
Decreased 11-15% 6 17% .41 
Decreased 25% or More 6 0% .00 
 
 
 
The remainder of the questions in this category deal with the managers’ 
perceptions of loyalty in his/her own cooperative. The first questions deal with how 
critical the financial condition of members and improving member services are to the 
cooperative base on a likert scale with 5 signifying “very critical”, 3 signifying “neutral” 
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and 1 signifying “not critical”. In the question relating to the financial condition of 
members, managers in this group felt that this was a “critical” issue; however, managers 
in the bottom performer group were “neutral” about improving member services. The 
sample as a whole felt that both categories are “critical”. In an overlapping question with 
the competition category, only 33% of managers felt that member loyalty was critical to 
the cooperative’s ability to compete. This is down by 36% from the sample as a whole, 
which had listed member loyalty as the most critical factor affecting the cooperatives 
ability to compete with their closest rivals.  
The final group of questions was aimed at ascertaining the manager’s perceptions 
on the impact of various factors on member loyalty in their own cooperative. This was 
accomplished through the use of a likert scale where five equals “strongly agree”, three 
signifies “uncertain” and one signifies “strongly disagree”. The five factors, of 
professional expertise of staff, confidence in the general manager, confidence in the 
board of directors, the level of community involvement, and customer service were split 
between managers “agreeing” with the statement or “strongly agreeing” with the 
statement. The respondents “agreed” that professional expertise of staff, community 
involvement, and confidence in the board of directors greatly impacts member loyalty. 
However, they “strongly agree” that customer service and confidence in the general 
manager impacts member loyalty.   
When questioned whether cooperatives are losing large farmers as customers and 
members, managers are “undecided” as compared to the sample as a whole which 
“disagreed” with this statement. Finally, when questioned whether it is essential to 
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educate members of the operational decisions of the company, bottom performer 
managers “agree” with an average of 4. Generally, the bottom performer group does not 
appear to “agree” with the literature as well as the sample as a whole or the top 
performer group, which could be a result of bias from the small sample size.  
4.4 Comparison of Top Performers and Bottom Performers 
In comparing the top and bottom performers there is an obvious difference in size 
as well as in sales volume, indicating that some significant differences are occurring. 
The top performers appear to be making a better use of debt capital. Current liabilities in 
top performers were approximately $2.1 million compared to only $926,024 for the 
bottom performers, which is not surprising considering the size difference. However, the 
long term liabilities of top performers are $306,539 compared to the bottom performers’ 
average $573,862. In comparing the debt to equity ratio of these two firms, the top 
performers have only 41.13% versus 143.79% for the bottom performers. This limits the 
options for diversification or expansion for bottom performers, because their ability to 
obtain further debt capital is likely limited. 
Working capital for the top performers is $2.8 million compared to only 
$711,000 for bottom performers. When looked at working capital as a ratio with sales, 
working capital to sales for top performers is 16% compared to the bottom performers 
14%. The typical benchmarks for this area are 10-15% for small cooperatives, and 
greater than 5% for large cooperatives. It is encouraging to note, that both groups fall 
into the acceptable range meaning that neither of the groups are likely out of long term 
debt covenant requirements with their financial lender. The net working capital for the 
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bottom performers is 26.58% compared to 32.84%. In accounts receivable turnover, the 
top group had an average turnover of 14 days, compared to the bottom performers who 
had an average turnover of 12 days.  
In comparing the operational aspects of the business, the size difference between 
the two groups of companies is obvious. Therefore, the logical place to delve further is 
into the operational and management philosophies of the two subgroups. In relation to 
competition, the bottom performers obviously face a larger number of competitors, but 
this does not stop their managers from believing they are a leading competitor in their 
market. In looking at the differences between the two subgroups in relation to the factors 
impacting the cooperative’s ability to compete, top performers are more likely to look 
internally toward member loyalty, pricing policies, leadership experience and employee 
expertise as well as externally toward the number of competitors. The bottom performers 
appear to dwell more on factors that cannot be readily changed such as the number of 
competitors, government policies, and location of the company. Figure 2 provides a 
complete listing of the critical factors to these two groups and the difference between the 
two.  
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Figure 2: Factors Critical to the Success of the Cooperative 
 
 
In considering the active membership trend of these two companies the top 
performer cooperatives have had some movement in their membership, whereas the 
bottom performer group has had a stagnant membership with the majority of 
cooperatives not having any movement in any direction. Figure 3 provides a comparison 
of the membership trends between these two cooperative groups.  
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Figure 3: Membership Trend Comparison  
 
 
To become more competitive, many companies (often in strategic planning 
retreats) will perform an analysis of their membership in order to identify who their top 
customers are and to consider policies that might provides some incentive to remain a 
member of the cooperative (or to become a member). Both sets of managers agree that it 
is important to identify the top 25 customers of their cooperative, so to see any 
difference in these two groups another question which takes the issue a little deeper is 
analyzed.  
The question gives the manager a choice of saying they have not identified who 
the top 25 customers are, they have a general idea of who their top 25 customers are, 
they have specifically identified their top 25 members, or they have specifically 
identified their top 25 members and taken steps to retain them. It also provides the 
standard option of writing in an “other” answer. Top performers were scattered among 
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the options with the largest percentage (44%) having specifically identified the top 25 
and taken steps to retain them. The bottom performers had specifically identified the top 
25 (67%) but not many had gone to the next level and taken steps to retain them (44%). 
Table 13 provides a breakdown of this question.  
 
 
Table13: Top 25 Customer Identification between the Two Groups 
Cooperative Has Sample 
as a 
Whole 
Top 
Performers 
Bottom 
Performers
Not identified who the top 25 customers are 9% 11% 0% 
A general idea of who the top 25 customers are 30% 17% 17% 
Specifically identified the top 25 customers 28% 33% 67% 
Specifically identified the top 25 and taken steps 
to retain/ recruit them  
33% 44% 17% 
Other 4% 6% 0% 
 
 
In reference to the equity position of the two cooperatives, the starkest difference 
is that the top performers have the expected distribution among various equity 
redemption policies with a few cooperatives that do not have an equity redemption 
policy. However, the bottom performers do not have any formal equity redemption 
policy at all. There could be many reasons for this, but it still casts a shadow on any 
opinions they might have on the positive aspects of equity redemption.  
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The top performer group appears to be taking the benefits of strategic planning 
seriously, as do the bottom performers. However, when considering the “results” of 
strategic planning, namely efficiency, growth and long run economic viability the 
bottom performers do not appear to be gaining the same benefits from strategic planning. 
Perhaps this is because bottom performers are not willing to implement the change 
required from an effective strategic plan or perhaps there situation does not allow them 
to implement any kind of drastic change.  
In reference to loyalty, these two groups are very different. The top performers 
have more members to be concerned about; therefore, member loyalty may be a bigger 
issue with them. However, the fact that bottom performers are uncertain whether they 
are losing large farmers as members should be a key indicator to them that they need to 
begin considering policies that could draw these members back in. This is assuming that 
they did not lose these large members due to retirement, death, or the loss of their farm 
land to urban sprawl. 
The bottom performers were also uncertain when asked about policies that would 
treat large farmers differently and how their other members would support those 
policies. The top performers disagreed that they were losing large members, and felt that 
their current members would not support differential pricing policies; however, they 
were uncertain whether they would need to treat large members differently in the future. 
As a summary, Table 14 is an overview of those issues that are most critical to the 
cooperative. Both of these groups appear to be concerned about the same issues, but the 
top performer group is certainly better equipped to handle these situations.  
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Table 14: Critical Issues to Cooperatives in the Top and Bottom Performer Groups 
 Sample as 
a Whole 
Top 
Performers 
Bottom 
Performers 
Availability and Skill of Labor 4 5 4 
Business Volume 5 5 5 
Cost and Availability of Insurance 4 4 4 
Differential Pricing Strategies 3 2 3 
Environmental Regulations and Legal 
Liabilities 
4 4 4 
Farm Programs 4 4 4 
Financial Conditions of Members 4 4 4 
Financial Management 4 4 4 
Improving Member Services 4 4 3 
Inadequate re-investment in cooperative 
Infrastructure 
3 3 3 
Innovation/Technology in Cooperative 
Operations 
3 4 3 
Labor Regulations 3 3 3 
National and World Economies 4 4 4 
Other 5 0 1 
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CHAPTER V 
CAUSAL DIAGRAMS DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
 
 
The statistical summary is very informative of how cooperatives appear to 
behave “on average” but it does not answer the question this study seeks. Knowing that a 
difference exists in particular categories cannot explain why some companies exhibit 
certain characteristics and others do not. In order to answer that question, knowledge of 
the causal flows in the business is important. The benefits if using causal graphs is 
outlined in the procedures section. This section presents the directed acyclic graphs 
associated with the categories of questions presented in the statistical summary section. 
The graphs could not be run for each subgroup because of an issue with degrees of 
freedom. So these issues are addressed in the regressions presented in the following 
section.  
5.1 Basic Model 
The first step in the Bayesian Network analysis is to establish a minimal model 
that is useful in portraying the average Texas cooperative. Once this basic model is 
established the network can then be interfered in with outside variables to see how they 
interact with the minimal model and whether the minimal model relationships shift with 
the introduction of this new information. The first section, 5.1.1 is an explanation of the 
variables and the correlation among variables. Section 5.1.2 is a presentation of the 
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graphical model and an explanation of the relationships seen in the model. Finally 
section 5.1.3 is a short discussion of the implications of the model.  
5.1.1 Variables 
The basic model is made up of financial and operational information about the 
business. The statistical information and the literature were used to establish a pool of 
questions that would identify a minimal model. These numbers were then used to 
develop a correlation matrix and each value in the matrix was tested for significance 
using a t-test at the 5% significance level. Those variables that were significantly 
correlated to at least one other variable were included in the final correlation matrix that 
was used to develop the causal diagrams. These variables are as follows:  
 Q1: Regional Cooperative: whether or not the cooperative is of a centralized or 
federated structure, whether or not a cooperative is regional creates new 
challenges for management. 
 Q2: Accounts Receivable: AR management can be a challenge, and although it is 
a part of current assets, it was felt that this variable could have a great impact on 
overall performance.  
 Q3: Current Assets: A key balance sheet account 
 Q4: Fixed Assets: the fixed assets of the company are a measure of size and are a 
key account in ratio analysis.  
 Q5: Current Liabilities: often in the form of a revolving seasonal debt account 
 Q6: Long Term Liabilities: the long term debt of the company give the researcher 
an idea of the future cash needs of the company 
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 Q7: Retained Earnings: an important account that many cooperatives do not build 
to a level approaching IOF levels 
 Q8: Stockholder and Patron Equity: the ownership account of the cooperative 
 Q9: Sales: a measure of the business of the cooperative 
 Q10: Cost of Goods Sold (COGS): a key factor in determining the price of goods 
offered by the cooperative 
 Q11: Total Expenses: can be a measure of how efficiently a cooperative uses its 
resources 
 Q12: Cash Patronage Distribution: one of the incentives members have to 
maintain their membership and continue their patronage in the cooperative.   
 Q13: Active Membership: the size of the active membership of the cooperative 
 Q14: Age of the Oldest Stock Outstanding: a measure of the frequency of equity 
redemption 
 Q15: Board Size: a measure of the size of the company and possibly a 
determinant of the level of control in the company 
 Q16: Number of Locations (including the primary location): seeks to identify the 
positive effects of economies of scale or the negative effects of being too large to 
be efficient.  
 Q17: Average Annual Capital Expenditures: a measure of the growth potential of 
the cooperative 
 Q18b: Number of Business Activities the Cooperative Is Involved In: measures 
the impact of having too many activities or not enough.  
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 Q19b: Total Number of Business Rivals: measures the impact of competition on 
the company’s performance 
 Q20b: Percent of Time Spent by the Manager on Their Greatest Challenge: 
measures for the 80/20 rule.  
These variables were chosen for either their direct relation to performance or the 
probability of a direct relation to performance. No totals were used because the most 
basic building blocks of the finances were included in the minimal model. Additionally, 
when totals of these basic elements are included a bias is created because of the prior 
correlation of the variables. Accounts receivables is included because it is only one 
element in current assets, therefore, will not create a bias.  
5.1.2 The Basic Graphical Model 
The basic (minimal) model was run through the PC Algorithm and yielded the 
model shown in Figure 4. This model is a directed acyclic graph as shown by the 
absence of paths leading away from a variable only to return to the same variable. In 
addition only unidirectional marks were discovered. The roots of the graph are the cash 
patronage distribution, the cost of goods sold and total rivals of the cooperative. The 
sinks of the model are the number of locations, average annual capital expenditures, 
active membership, sales and the number of business activities the cooperative is 
involved in. The line of directed edges leading from each root to each sink is called the 
“path” between the two vertices. Each path will be discussed in more detail in the 
discussion and implications section. 
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Figure 4: Basic Directed Acyclic Graph of Texas Cooperatives 
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In this graph the algorithm produced unidirectional causal relationships in the 
variables with the exception of accounts receivable, percent of time the manager spends 
a day on his greatest challenge, and the age of the oldest outstanding stock. Although 
these three variables were correlated to other variables in the model, there was not 
sufficient evidence to suggest a causal relationship.  
These relationships form the backbone of the interventions relating to 
competition, equity, strategic planning and loyalty later on. Therefore, the first step is to 
understand this structure. It is important to again note that the skeletal structure should 
remain constant in a robust model; therefore, the direction of causation may change as 
we intervene in the model as long as the basic interrelationships remain the same.  
The first relationship in these graphs is the total number of rivals of the firm 
having a causal relationship to the retained earnings of the firm. This relationship is 
likely due to the competitive pressures of a larger number of rivals on the cooperative’s 
bottom line, therefore making it more difficult to retain great amounts of earnings in any 
given year. The second relationship is the retained earnings’ causal influence on the 
current liabilities account. Because retained earnings represent assets at the company’s 
disposal for use in building the business, the current liabilities of the company do not 
have to be used as much. Often the largest portion of current liabilities in cooperatives is 
the revolving seasonal line of credit used to cover payables or hedge commodities.  
The current liabilities and current assets are used to determine working capital 
and therefore should be linked in some manner. Part of current liabilities may be used to 
capitalize fixed assets, particularly in the case of machinery and other fixed assets with 
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short term lending requirements. Fixed assets are a causal influence on long term 
liabilities because what is not capitalized through current liabilities or retained earnings 
would be capitalized through term debt. This relationship can then be followed through 
to the number of locations and the average annual capital expenditures, both of which 
use long term liabilities, current liabilities and retained earnings in their financing. 
Notice that pathway flows along all of these things before ending at these two sinks. The 
parent of both of these sinks in this graph is the total number of rivals for the 
cooperative.  
In moving down another line, the current assets have a causal influence on the 
stockholder and patron equity which is probably a reflection of the association between 
equity, and assets and liabilities. Equity then has a causal influence over total expenses 
of the company which has causal influence over the number of active members in the 
cooperatives. Therefore, the variable “total rivals” is the parent of the number of active 
members as well. Total expense also opens up the flow of information to the board size 
and whether the cooperative is regional in form. This in turn has a causal influence on 
the number of business activities of the firm. Regionals tend to be more specialized than 
local, centralized cooperatives therefore this direction of causation is logical. Again the 
parent of the sink variable “number of business activities” is the total rivals of the 
cooperative.  
The final path we can take is through current assets, toward sales. This path is 
logical based on the fact that current assets hold the inventories and accounts receivables 
of the firm. Other roots that feed into this variable are the cost of goods sold and the cash 
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patronage distribution of the firm. Therefore the sink variable “sales” has three parent 
variables. The mathematical implications of these relationships are discussed in the 
following section.  
5.1.3 Discussion and Implications 
Using the probability calculus presented in the procedures section and the 
Markov Parent Theorem, the following functions are defined for the paths of the basic 
graph. The first four of the five functions are similar in that their Markovian Parent is the 
total number of rivals the cooperative faces. The only exception is the function for sales, 
which also includes the cost of goods sold and the cash patronage dividend. 
Pr (Q16 | paQ16 ) = Pr ( Q16 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q17 | paQ17 ) = Pr ( Q17 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q13 | paQ13 ) = Pr ( Q13 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q18b | paQ18b ) = Pr ( Q18b | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q9 | paQ9 ) = Pr ( Q9 | Q10, Q12, Q19b ) 
These probability functions provide the basis on which the regression models will be 
built in chapter six.  
5.2 Competition 
The cooperatives in this sample present clear evidence for the importance of 
competition to cooperative performance, as presented in the statistical summary section. 
The questions whose answers were presented in chapter four will now be used to 
ascertain their causal relationship to the basic model.  
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5.2.1 Variables 
The first eighteen variables are the same as in the minimal model. Variable Q19b 
has been split into two variables Q19c and Q20c, which is the number of cooperative 
competitors and the number of national chain competitors respectively. The number of 
internet competitors was not significantly correlated to any other variable in the model 
and was thrown out. Variable Q21c is now the percentage of time spent by the manager 
on his greatest challenge.  
 Q22c: No Formal Equity Redemption Policy 
 Q23c:  Employee Expertise Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q24c: Government Policies Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q25c: The Utilization of Technology and the Internet’s Ability to Impact 
Competitiveness 
 Q26c:  Leadership’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q27c: Location’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q28c: Member Loyalty’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q29c: Number of Competitor’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q30c: Technological Advancement’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q31c: Unique Product Offering’s Ability to Impact Competitiveness 
 Q32c: Membership Size Stayed the Same 
 Q33c: Manager’s Agreement/Disagreement that the Company is a Leading 
Competitor 
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5.2.2 The Competition Graphical Model 
The graphical model presented in Figure 5 is a representation of the basic model 
when the above competitive variables are intervened in the basic model. Two variables 
were found to have no correlation to anything else, these were accounts receivable and 
membership size remaining the same. The percent of time spent by management on 
his/her greatest challenge was found to be correlated to cooperative location’s impact on 
competitiveness and the age of oldest stock was found to be correlated to technological 
advancement’s impact on competitiveness; however, none of these variables were 
correlated to the primary graph.  
The model is an acyclic graph but some of its edges are undirected. Visually, 
those edges that have no marker on them are undirected. The undirected edges that join 
them signify that although the two variables are correlated and some relationship exists 
between them, the algorithm could not determine the direction of causal flow. Because 
these are Bayesian networks it is possible to estimate the direction of causation based on 
prior knowledge of the industry and, in this case, of basic accounting principles.  
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Figure 5: Directed Acyclic Graph of Texas Cooperatives with Competitive Variables 
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The first undirected edge is the edge lying between the belief that the cooperative 
is a leading competitor among its rivals, (which is a likert scale question in which 
managers strongly agree, agree, remain undecided, disagree or strongly disagree) and the 
number of cooperative competitors the firm faces in their market. It is possible that the 
number of cooperative competitors is a cause of the belief that the cooperative is a 
leading competitor since a larger number of competitors would make it harder to be a 
leading competitor in the market. 
Q19cÆ Q33c
The second undefined relationship is between the number of cooperative 
competitors and the current assets account of the company. Given the relationship of 
total rivals and current assets in the basic model and other models, it is probable that the 
number of cooperative competitors has a causal influence on the current assets of the 
company. 
Q19cÆ Q3 
The third undefined relationship can be estimated by looking at the other graphs. 
The causal flow between current assets and stockholder/ patron equity is a flow away 
from current assets toward stockholder/ patron equity. This relationship is evident in the 
other graphs developed off of the basic graph; therefore, it is highly possible that this 
relationship will hold true in this case as well.  
Q3Æ Q8 
The relationship between stockholder and patron equity and the variable total 
expenses is less constant across the various graphs developed here. Therefore, it is 
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unknown what this causal direction is in the case of this graph. Finally, the relationship 
between the number of active members in the cooperative and total expenses is a 
movement away from total expenses toward the number of active members. Like the 
relationship between current assets and stockholder / patron equity, this relationship has 
the same direction of causation throughout the graphical analysis, so it is likely present 
here. There is no way of knowing if the above estimates are robust given a larger sample 
size; therefore, they must be considered cautiously. 
Q11Æ Q13 
The other relationships among the basic variables are in agreement with the 
skeletal basic graph, and the undirected edge is making a connection between variables 
that are connected in the basic model. This makes the model a robust picture of the 
market when competitive variables are used to intervene in the model. Specifically the 
manager’s perceptions of whether the nine variables of government policies, leadership, 
loyalty, unique product, employee expertise, number of competitors, internet usage, 
technological advancement and location impact competitiveness impacted strategic 
points on the graph.  
Government policies have a causal influence on the cash patronage distribution 
of the company. This makes sense on the merits of the farm program and taxation alone. 
Leadership’s impact on competitiveness is a causal factor in board size. This may be 
related to the fact that the more successful cooperatives tend to have larger boards. As 
we move along that same path, the relationship between the number of business 
activities and its causal influence on loyalty’s impact on competitiveness could be 
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related to managers’ feelings that by meeting the needs of the customer, they are 
impacting loyalty.  
Loyalty’s impact on competitiveness and the retained earnings of the company 
both have a causal relationship on the number of national chain competitors. It is 
possible that loyalty is related to how managers feel they are meeting the needs of the 
customers and whether those customers will seek other sources and that the retained 
earnings has some relation to the size of the company. These two factors combined will 
determine how much of the customer base will turn to national chain stores to meet their 
needs. Loyalty’s impact on competitiveness also has a causal influence on the unique 
product offering’s impact on competitiveness. Again, this is likely due to the manager’s 
perception of his/her own competitive environment. A unique product requires 
specialized employee expertise. Employees are often overlooked in their importance in 
the business, but as this graph shows the employee expertise can have an impact on how 
much the number of close competitors impacts the business’s competitive situation and it 
also impacts how the use of the internet impacts the company’s competitive situation.  
The final two variables intervened in this model are the number of cooperative 
competitors and the manager’s belief that the cooperative is a leading competitor among 
its closest rivals. These were discussed earlier.  
Variables that were correlated but did not have a causal relationship in the model 
are accounts receivable, percent of time spent by the manager on his greatest challenge, 
age of oldest stock, and technological advancement’s impact on competitiveness. There 
is some sort of relationship between location and time spent on the manager’s greatest 
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challenge and age of stock and technological advancement; however, these variables are 
not intervening on the basic model and are therefore will not be analyzed further at this 
time.  
5.2.3 Discussion and Implications 
Unlike in the basic probability functions, these functions have unique parent sets. 
The first function for the number of competitors’ ability to impact competitiveness is 
impacted by only one variable, which is leadership’s ability to impact competitiveness. It 
is likely that at least one other variable should be included here. According to the logic 
presented earlier this could be variable Q19c, the number of cooperative competitors; 
however, because these relationships are undefined it is unknown what exactly the other 
variable would be in this case. The same holds true for the variable for technology and 
the internet’s impact on competitiveness.  
Pr (Q29c | paQ29c ) = Pr ( Q29c | Q26c ) 
Pr (Q25c | paQ25c ) = Pr ( Q25c | Q26c ) 
The average annual capital expenditures probability function only contains 
parents from the basic variable set.  
Pr (Q17 | paQ17 ) = Pr ( Q17 | Q16, Q7 ) 
The probability function for the cooperative having no formal equity redemption policy 
depends solely on the leadership’s ability to impact competitiveness. Like in the first 
function, this likely has another factor, but due to the undirected relationships it is not 
possible to be able to tell what that variable is.  
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The function for the number of national chain competitors is very similar.  
Pr (Q22c | paQ22c ) = Pr ( Q22c | Q26c ) 
Pr (Q20c | paQ20c ) = Pr ( Q20c | Q7, Q26c ) 
The sales function could also have another variable from that set in its Markovian Parent 
set; however, we know that the cost of goods sold and government polices’ impact on 
competitiveness are Markovian Parents.  
Pr (Q9 | paQ9 ) = Pr ( Q9 | Q10, Q24c ) 
5.3 Equity 
The equity model of the cooperative firm is important because by understanding 
the relationship of equity and equity management to the rest of the cooperative, we can 
make general conclusions as to how equity impacts performance. Equity management 
should provide a positive impact on performance because it provides incentive to 
members to continue their patronization of the business.  
5.3.1 Variables 
The first 20 variables of the equity model are the variables of the base model. 
The remaining four variables are those variables that  
 Q21e: Revolving Fund Equity Redemption Plan 
 Q22e: Percentage of All Equities Redemption Plan 
 Q23e: No Formal Equity Redemption Policy 
 Q24e: Manager Seeks Further Education on Balancing Dividend Payments and 
Equity Redemption 
 Q25e: Manager Agrees that Members Understand the Equity Redemption Policy 
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In the case of the equity model, there were very few variables considered that 
were correlated at the 5% significance level. The graphical model of this portion of the 
study is included in the following section.  
5.3.2 Equity Graphical Model 
The graphical model presented in Figure 6 is a representation of the basic model 
when equity variables are used to intervene in the basic relationships. Only two new 
relationships are apparent in the basic model when equity variables are used to intervene 
in it. The first is the undirected edge between the number of locations and the 
cooperative utilizing a percentage of all equities redemption policy. It is unlikely that 
this variable is more than a pass through on the path from the number of locations to the 
long term liabilities of the company because so few cooperatives selected this variable. 
Therefore the direction of causation is thought to be from the number of locations 
through the percentage of all equities plan and to the long term liabilities.  
Q16Æ Q22e
The other new relationship is not through a new variable. This is the only 
permeation of the graph in which a causal relationship is found between whether or not 
the cooperative is a regional cooperative and the cash patronage distribution. Because 
regionals are usually such large companies that return large cash dividends to their 
customers, this relationship is logical; however, it is unknown why this is the only graph 
in which this relationship exists.  
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The other variables are found outside of the basic diagram. There is an undefined 
relationship between three of the variables added relating to equity, but the other four 
variables are unrelated to each other or the basic model. Therefore, they will not be 
analyzed any further in this study.  
5.3.3 Discussions and Implications 
The equity probability function sis very similar to the basic probability functions. 
In fact the functions for average annual capital expenditures, active membership, and 
number of business activities are exactly like the basic model.  
Pr (Q17 | paQ17 ) = Pr ( Q17 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q13 | paQ13 ) = Pr ( Q13 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q18b | paQ18b ) = Pr ( Q18b | Q19b ) 
The only function that is different is the function representing the sales of the 
firm. In this case the Markovian Parents are the same; however, one more variable that is 
not a parent must be included in the analysis because the function does not meet the back 
door criterion without it. One of the variables along the back door path to sales must be 
included, in this case the variable for whether or not the cooperative is regional was 
chosen.  
Pr (Q9 | paQ9 ) = Pr ( Q9 | Q19b, Q10, Q1 ) 
5.4 Strategic Planning 
The Strategic Planning model had the greatest number of possible variables 
because of the consideration of those variables dealing with efficiency, growth and 
diversification. However, few of these variables were found to be correlated to other 
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variables in this permeation of the model. Therefore, only 26 total variables were used, 
the first 20 of which are the variables of the basic model. The other six variables are as 
follows:  
5.4.1 Variables 
 Q21sp: No Formal Equity Redemption Plan 
 Q22sp: Manager Seeks Further Education on Strategic Planning 
 Q23sp: Manager’s Level of Belief that the Cooperative’s Current Position Allows 
for Future Growth 
 Q24sp: Manager’s Level of Belief that the Cooperative is Efficient Enough for 
Future Growth 
 Q25sp: Manager’s Level of Belief that it is Important to Have a Strategic Plan 
 Q26sp: Manager’s Level of Belief that it is Important to Review and Potentially 
Revise the Strategic Plan at Least Annually 
These variables were then run through the PC Algorithm to produce the graphical 
representation presented in the next section. Of these six variables, five of them make it 
into the model. The exception is variable Q21sp, no formal equity redemption policy. 
5.4.2 The Strategic Planning Graphical Model 
The basic model skeleton still remains in this model; however, instead of the 
number of locations being a sink, the new variables all branch off of that one variable, 
Q16. The graph is show in Figure 7 below. The new sink in this case is management’s 
level of belief that the cooperative is efficient enough for future economic growth. 
Perhaps, when the cooperative is at its optimal size, partially given by the number of 
 
 The other variables attached to this model do not have a direction of causation. 
We only know that a relationship of some kind exists. These variables are the age of the 
oldest stock outstanding, the manager’s level of belief that it is important to have a 
strategic plan and his/her level of belief that it is important to review that strategic plan 
at least annually. The age of the oldest stock outstanding is a measure of how up to date 
the cooperative is in their equity redemption. Since equity redemption is related to the 
cooperative’s current financial position, this relationship makes sense and there could be 
a causal flow from the age of oldest stock to the manager’s belief in his current position. 
However, it is unknown how the other two variables related to each other or the age of 
oldest stock.  
locations, it influences the manager’s opinion in this relation. On the other side of this 
sink variable is the management’s level of belief that the cooperative’s current position 
allows for future economic growth. Because of the closeness of these two questions, it is 
logical that they should be related.  
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Figure 7: Directed Acyclic Graph of Texas Cooperatives with Strategic Planning Variables 
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5.4.3 Discussions and Implications 
The strategic planning functions again fall into similar form as the basic model 
probability functions. Again every function depends on the total rivals of the firm, only 
instead of the number of locations being a sink, the management’s belief that the 
cooperative is efficient enough for future economic growth is a sink. This new sink 
variable again depends on total rivals and also on the manager’s belief that the 
cooperative’s current financial position will allow for future economic growth.  
Pr (Q17 | paQ17 ) = Pr ( Q17 | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q24sp | paQ24sp ) = Pr ( Q24sp | Q19b, Q23sp) 
Pr (Q18b | paQ18b ) = Pr ( Q18b | Q19b ) 
Pr (Q9 | paQ9 ) = Pr ( Q9 | Q19b, Q10, Q12 ) 
5.5 Loyalty 
The final category for which a causal diagram was created is in relation to 
member loyalty. As discussed earlier, member loyalty can be extremely important to the 
company. In addition, where we have seen member loyalty in these graphs thus far has 
show that it is a factor worth mentioning and one that needs to be delved into further.  
5.5.1 Variables 
The variables of this category were put through the same methodology as in 
previous categories to obtain the variables that would be intervened into the basic model. 
A larger number of variables were correlated in this category than in some of the others. 
The first 20 variables are the variables of the basic model.  
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 Q21l: No Formal Equity Plan 
 Q22l: Financial Condition of Members as a Critical Factor to the Success of the 
Business 
 Q23l: Improving Member Services as a Critical Factor to the Success of the 
Business 
 Q24l: Member Loyalty’s Impact on the Competitiveness of the Cooperative 
 Q25l: Membership Size Increase 
 Q26l: Membership Size Decrease 
 Q27l: Manager’s level of belief that it is Important to Educate Members on the 
Operational Issues of the Cooperative.  
 Q28l: Manager’s level of belief that customer service greatly impacts loyalty 
 Q29l: Manager’s level of belief that employee expertise greatly impacts loyalty 
 Q30l: Manager’s level of belief that community involvement greatly impacts 
loyalty 
 Q31l: Manager’s level of belief that confidence in the general manager greatly 
impacts loyalty 
 Q32l: Manager’s level of belief that confidence in the board of directors greatly 
impacts loyalty.  
When these variables are used to intervene in the basic model the following graphical 
model is discovered.  
 
 
 
 Furthermore, the general manager’s impact on loyalty has a causal influence on 
the impact of employee expertise and the impact of customer service. Since both of these 
factors are under the direct influence of the general manager, this causal flow is logical. 
The connection between the employee expertise’s impact on loyalty and the age of oldest 
stock is not easily explained in the context of this study. Employee expertise also 
influences the impact member loyalty has on competitiveness. Employees, being those 
who customers are serviced by, could reasonably have a direct influence on the loyalty 
of that customer, and such a relationship has been exhibited in the DAG of Texas 
Cooperatives with Competitive Variables as well.  
The graphical model for the loyalty category is a directed acyclic graph that 
shares the same skeleton as the basic model. The graph is shown in Figure 8 below. The 
variables added to the basic model attach themselves through the outside of the graph 
rather than intervening between two variables from the basic relationship. To begin at 
the left hand side of the model, in this permeation the percent of time spent by 
management on his/her greatest challenge is a cause of the manager’s level of belief that 
confidence in the board has a great impact on member loyalty. This in turn has a causal 
influence on the manager’s level of belief that confidence in the general manager greatly 
impacts member loyalty. These relationships are directly related to the manager, who 
filled the original survey out, and are logically connected in such a way.  
5.5.2 The Loyalty Graphical Model 
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Figure 8: Directed Acyclic Graph of Texas Cooperatives with Member Loyalty Variables 
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Loyalty is also impacted by the number of business activities the cooperative is 
involved in. Loyalty’s impact on competitiveness then has a causal influence on the 
number of rivals managers consider to be close rivals. This is logical since the number of 
customers loyal to the company determines the competitive advantage of the 
cooperative.  
The financial condition of members has a causal influence on how critical the 
manager feels it is to improve member services. This variable is also caused by the 
variable membership size decrease. Often in struggling cooperatives, such as those 
observed in the bottom performer group, improving member services through the 
cooperative is one way to help customers remain members and farmers. This sink 
variable is impacted by one more thing, the number of locations of the company. It is 
possible that the number of locations is one way of providing a member service, by 
providing the customer with a geographically convenient place to take their crops or 
purchase their inputs.  
The membership size decrease is shown to cause customer service’s impact on 
loyalty as well. Again, one way to create value with the cooperative’s members is to 
provide them with better service. This does not necessarily mean expanded service, only 
a higher quality of the services already being provided. The final link from membership 
size decrease is toward membership size increase. It is likely that these are correlated 
simply by their closeness to each other. In order to not risk biasing the data, the variable 
“membership size stayed the same” was omitted.  
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The impact of customer service on loyalty also has a causal influence on the 
manager’s level of belief that community service greatly impacts loyalty. This particular 
idea has come under some scrutiny lately as more cooperatives are moving toward a 
more entrepreneurial culture. However, it still appears to have some influence on loyalty 
in the eyes of managers in Texas, and it probably does in small towns where the 
cooperative is the hub of local activity. This variable in turn has a causal influence on the 
variable “regional”. A regional cooperative does not usually have members in the 
community they operate out of, therefore, it is likely that if a cooperative is regional in 
structure, community involvement will not be as important as compared to a small 
centralized cooperative.  
Two variables did not make it into this final model, accounts receivable and the 
manager’s level of belief that it is critical to educate members on operational decisions. 
This model still maintains the basic model skeleton, making it a robust and stable model.  
5.5.3 Discussion and Implications 
The loyalty model creates the most complex probability functions of the various 
categories because so many new variables are included in the roots and sinks of the 
model. Average annual capital expenditures relies on variables introduced to the basic 
model as well as drawing in the percent of time the manager spends on his greatest 
challenge, which had no causal relationship with the other parts of the model before, and 
the number of business activities of the cooperative.  
Pr (Q17 | paQ17 ) = Pr ( Q17 | Q20b, Q21l , Q26l, Q18b, Q24l) 
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The age of the oldest stock outstanding is another variable that had no causal 
relationships with other variables in the model before. In addition to Q20b, it also draws 
in the influence of a cooperative having no formal equity redemption policy.  
Pr(Q14 | paQ14 ) = Pr ( Q14 | Q20b, Q21l ) 
The probability functions for improving member services’ criticalness to the 
success of the business and the membership size increase function are similar, except 
that Q23l also has the variable for member loyalty’s criticalness to the success of the 
business included to block a back door path.  
Pr (Q23l | paQ23l ) = Pr ( Q23l | Q20b, Q21l,  Q26l, Q18b, Q24l) 
Pr (Q25l | paQ25l ) = Pr ( Q25l | Q20b , Q21l, Q26l, Q18b) 
The functions for active membership and sales are similar except that the sales 
function also has two additional Markovian Parents, and includes an additional variable 
for member loyalty’s criticalness to the success of the business in order to block a back 
door path.  
Pr (Q13 | paQ13 ) = Pr ( Q13 | Q20b , Q21l , Q26l, Q18b) 
Pr (Q9 | paQ9 ) = Pr ( Q9 | Q20b, Q21l , Q26l , Q18b , Q10, Q12, Q24l ) 
5.6 Summary of Causal Diagrams 
It is clear from the probability functions obtained from the causal graphs that 
certain factors have a great impact on the performance of the business. The first and 
foremost of these is the number of rivals the cooperative faces in their market area. 
Kyriakopolous, Meulenberg and Nilsson noted the importance of competition as did 
Harling and Funk. Another factor that appears to have a great impact is member loyalty. 
 
104 
The member loyalty DAG showed that the various factors that could impact member 
loyalty have a causal impact on many different parts of the business. Equity redemption 
appears to play a minor role to the overall performance of the cooperative and the act of 
strategic planning will not assist the cooperative unless they act on that strategic plan.  
5.7 Limitations of Causal Diagrams 
These causal diagrams appear to be limited in how much they can tell us about 
the interaction of these various factors. In addition TETRAD is susceptible to Type I or 
Type II errors (Akowkuse and Bessler 2002). In particular, we are interested in the 
magnitude of influence the variables have on the dependent variables and whether the 
independent variables have a positive or negative influence on the dependent variables. 
Such questions can be addressed through the use to regression models. Another benefit 
of taking this analysis one step further is that these diagrams do not provide measures by 
which we can test for bias.  
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CHAPTER VI 
ECONOMETRIC DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
 
 
6.1 Overview of Regression Analysis  
The regression analysis presented in this chapter is the result of the casual chains 
presented in the previous chapter. Each function represents a path where the sink 
variable is the dependent variable and the Markovian Parent root variables are 
independent variables. In addition, certain independent variables must be added to meet 
the back door criterion. These variables block back paths so that only one path exists 
between a root and a sink.  
As a discussion of the use of directed graphs in building regression models, one 
must first revisit the idea of d-separation in directed graphs. D-separation exists when 
two variables, say X and Y, are connected by a path in which there is no other path Z 
that connects the two. In other words, the back door criterion is met. If such a back door 
path exists in Z, that path must be blocked by conditioning on either a middle node of the 
causal chain ( such is the case if l Æ m Æ n, and we condition on m) or a fork (such is 
the case if l Å m Æ n, and we condition on m). If the chain contains an inverted fork 
then we do not condition on the middle node, because to do such would un-block the 
path (such is the case if lÆ m Ån). In order to use directed graphs to build regression 
models, one must be able to identify and block back door paths, achieving d-separation. 
Just as in any other method of choosing regression variables, using directed graphs 
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requires one to carefully analyze the paths in the graph and choose appropriate variables 
that will “explain” those paths.  
By blocking back door paths, the modeler is preventing correlation between the 
error term and the root variable in the model. Essentially, when a back door path is left 
open, it is in the error term and therefore, the error term is correlated to the X variables 
because that back door path variable also causes X. So when some variable Z is the back 
door path our regression should resemble the formula below.  
Y = a + B1X + B2Z +e 
Upon identifying the models that met the back door criterion, they were analyzed 
using an ordinary least squares regression. Models were run for each path in the five 
graphs presented in chapter 5.   
6.2 Regression Analysis for the Sample as a Whole 
In answering the final portion of our objective question we must be able to 
compare the top and bottom groups; however, the first step in doing this is to identify 
those DAG paths that are the most robust. For each path listed in the chapter V an 
ordinary least squares regression was performed. The appropriate Probit regression was 
performed on those dependent variables that were dummy variables.  
Not all of the paths significantly explained the data. However, in every category, 
the path leading to the dependent variable “sales” results in beta coefficients that 
significantly explained the data as exhibited by the R2 of the model and the p-value and 
t-test of each coefficients. Therefore, these models will be used in the further regression 
analysis of the performance subgroups on the paths established by the directed graphs. 
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Due to our small sample size, the R2, Durbin-Watson Statistic, Wald Chi-Squared 
Statistic, Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Criterion were run to test for 
model fit, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
The “sales” model coefficients sufficiently explain the data and are presented in 
Table 15 below. Statistical test values were obtained from Kmenta 1971.The model for 
“sales” in the strategic planning category is identical to the “sales” model obtained from 
the basic DAG; therefore, it is only necessary to present one. In this case the basic model 
is presented. This is due to the fact that no strategic planning intervention variables were 
found to impact sales. As noted in chapter 5, only one path included new variables and 
the regression showed that the model did not sufficiently explain the data.  
 
 
Table 15: The Regression Models for Sales in the DAG Categories 
Variable Beta 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
T-Test P-Value  
Model: Basic      
Dependent Variable 
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9768 
Q10: COGS 1.0674 .04378 24.38*** .000 DF: 
28 
Q12: Cash Patronage Dist. 1.6187 .2581 6.271*** .000  
Q19b: Total Rivals 13369 112100 .11193 .906  
Intercept 1044800 839200 1.245 .223  
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Table 15 Continued      
Variable Beta 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
T-Test P-Value  
Model: Competition      
Dependent Variable:  
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9523 
Q10: COGS 1.1954 .05240 22.82***  DF: 
29 
Q24c: Government 
Policies’ Impact on 
Competitiveness 
5656000 2521000 2.244**   
Intercept 989320 742200 1.333*   
Model: Equity      
Dependent Variable 
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9554 
Q10 COGS 1.1611 .05514 21.06*** .000 DF: 
28 
Q1: Regional  
(Block) 
4125300 1556000 2.652*** .013  
Q19b: Total Rivals 30294 155400 .1950 .847  
Intercept 555620 1165000 .4768 .637  
Model: Loyalty      
Dependent Variable 
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9823 
Q10: COGS 1.0269 .04930 20.83*** .000 DF: 
24 
Q12: Cash Patronage 
Distribution 
1.6208 .2765 5.861*** .000  
Q18b: Number of 
Business Activities 
-47261 294500 -.1605 .874  
Q20b: Percent of Time 
Spent on Greatest 
Challenge 
-1194800 1184000 -1.009 .323  
Q21l: No Formal Equity 
Redemption Policy 
-1495200 901700 -1.658* .110  
Q24l: Loyalty’s Impact on 
Competitiveness (Block) 
-1557300 907200 -1.717** .099  
Q28l: Customer Service’s 
Impact on Loyalty (Block) 
-231300 562400 -.4113 .684  
Intercept 4449300 2488000 1.789** .086  
t-test: * 10% significance      ** 5% significance     ***1% significance 
DF: Dickey Fuller Statistic         COGS: Cost of Goods Sold 
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6.3 Expansion of Regression Models to Account for Performance Group 
Even with these first regression models, we still are not answering the question 
regarding whether or not the performance group the cooperative falls into has a 
significant impact in the data. There were two options for implementing this 
performance group dimension. The first is simply to run the regressions limiting the 
sample to those cooperatives that are top performers and again limiting to those 
cooperatives that are bottom performers. The benefit of this method is a clear distinction 
between the two groups; however, this method does not account for the interaction 
between the two variables in the model and the small sample size in the bottom 
performers could lead to problems. A second method is to create a new variable for 
performance group (P1) and use it as a slope and intercept shifter in the model. Variable 
P1 is a dummy variable in which “1” signifies the observation is a top performer and “0” 
signifies the observation is not a top performer. The reason we chose to define the results 
as either top performer or not top performer is due to the small number of bottom 
performer variables.  
In order to measure the effect of the performance group, the performance variable 
P1 will be added in two ways. The first, as an intercept shifter, will ascertain the effect of 
P1 on the intercept of the function. In order to find the effect of the performance group 
variable on the intercept of the function, the dummy variable was added as an 
independent variable to each “sales” model. Any change in the intercept beta coefficient 
of the function given this new variable is an indicator of the impact of performance 
group on the intercept.  
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As a slope shifter, P1 was used to determine the impact of performance group on 
the slope of the model. This was accomplished by adding a new variable to the model 
that measures the impact of the performance group in each independent variable. In this 
instance the dummy variable is multiplied by the independent variable in question, and 
this new variable is added to the model. By having the independent variable for the 
sample as a whole and the independent variable for the top performer sample, we can 
ascertain the impact of the performance group on the slope of the model by looking at 
changes in the beta coefficient related to the variable. The new variable pgQn is simply 
Qn * P1, where n is the variable number.  
6.3.1 The Basic Model 
In the basic model three independent variables could be compared to the top 
performer subgroups of those variables. The three variables are cost of goods sold, cash 
patronage distribution and the number of total rivals the cooperative competes with 
closely. Table 16 contains the results of the regression run on this model with the 
performance group taken into account.  
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Table 16: Basic Model Regression of Sales Given Performance Group Variables 
Variable Beta 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
T-ratio P-
value 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9802 
Q10: COGS 1.1508 .1194 9.636*** .000 DF: 
24 
Q12: Cash Patronage Distribution 2.1075 .9706 2.171*** .040 DW: 
1.8718 
Q19b: Total Rivals 
 
52101 170100 .3063 .762 AIC: 
29.576 
pgQ10: COGS Top Performers 
 
-.11041 .1289 -.8564 .400 SC: 
29.942 
pgQ12: Cash Patronage 
Distribution Top Performers 
-.58736 1.011 -.5807 .567  
pgQ19b: Total Rivals Top 
Performers 
 
-16110 230400 -.06992 .945  
P1: Top Performer Dummy 
 
2541000 1745000 1.457* .158  
Intercept 295070 1311000 -.2251 .824  
t-test: * 10% significance      **5% significance        ***1% significance  
COGS: Cost of Goods Sold 
DF: Dickey Fuller Statistic 
DW: Durbin Watson Statistic 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Criterion 
  
In this model the variables for cost of goods sold, cash patronage distribution and 
the performance group dummy variable significantly explain the data at least at the 10% 
significance level. The model as a whole has a high R2, and moderately low AIC and SC 
signifying a good fit to the data. The Durbin Watson Statistic is close to two; therefore, it 
is not likely that the data exhibits autocorrelation. The dummy variable for performance 
group has a significant t value, so being a top performing cooperative appears to have 
some impact on sales. However, the independent variables for COGS and cash patronage 
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distribution that include performance group did not appear to significantly explain the 
data. Therefore, joint hypothesis tests were run to determine whether the collective 
impact of the performance group could make a difference on the final result. The 
collective hypotheses were: 
H0: pg10 = pg12 = pg19b = p1 = 0 
H1: pg10 ≠ pg12 ≠ pg19b ≠ p1 ≠ 0 
The f statistic calculated was 1.0411, which is less than the critical value of 4.22 
at the 1% significance level. Therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
variables that include performance group dummy variable are equal to zero. In addition 
the Wald Chi-Squared Statistic of 4.1647 is less than the critical value of 13.28 at 4 
degrees of freedom and 1% significance level. Therefore we again fail to reject the null. 
In the basic model, performance group does not have a significant impact on sales.   
6.3.2 The Competition Model 
In the competition model the first path regression that significantly explains the 
data is the “sales” pathway, just as in the basic model. The additional variables of 
pg10=p1*q10 and pg24c=p1*q24c as well as the dummy variable p1 are added to the 
regression. The results are reported in Table17 below. 
The addition of variables accounting for the performance dummy variable results 
in the government policies’ impact on competitiveness among top performers being able 
to explain the data with 99% confidence. This is in addition to the cost of goods sold and 
top performer dummy variables, which are also significant. The R2 is high and the AIC 
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and SC are sufficiently low, so the model as a whole has a good fit. Durbin Watson is 
close to two, so there is no indication of autocorrelation. 
 
 
Table 17: The Competition Model Regression Results with Top Performer Variable 
Considered 
Variable Beta 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
T-ratio P-
value 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9757 
Q10: COGS 1.1698 .1271 9.205*** .000 DF:  
26 
Q24c: Government Policies’ 
Impact on Competitiveness 
1518600 2642000 -.5749 .570 DW: 
1.8071 
pgQ10: COGS Top Performers 
 
-.049005 .1349 -.3633 .719 AIC: 
29.658 
pgQ24c: Government Policies’ 
Impact on Competitiveness Top 
Performers 
15388000 3811000 4.038*** .000 SC: 
29.933 
P1: Top Performer Dummy 
 
2369300 1273000 1.861** .074  
Intercept 485990 882300 .5508 .586  
t-test: * 10% significance     **5% significance     ***1% significance 
COGS: Cost of Goods Sold 
DF: Dickey Fuller Statistic 
DW: Durbin Watson Statistic 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Criterion 
 
 
Although there appears to be evidence that performance group has a significant 
impact on the model, a joint hypothesis test was run to discover whether the collective 
impact of the performance group on all of the independent variables of the model is 
significant. The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
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H0: pg10 = pg24c = p1 = 0 
H1: pg10 ≠ pg24c ≠ p1 ≠ 0 
In analyzing the results of the joint hypothesis test, the f statistic of 8.338535 is 
greater than the critical value of 4.64 at the 1% significance level. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Furthermore, the Wald Chi-Squared Statistic is 25.0156, which is 
greater than the critical value of 11.345 at 3 degrees of freedom and 1% significance. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis. Therefore we can conclude that performance 
group has a significant impact in this model including competition variables.  
6.3.3 The Equity Model 
The equity model is a further analysis of the sales pathway, with variables for 
cost of goods sold, total rivals and whether or not the cooperative is a regional. The final 
variable for regional is a block variable to block a back door path into the dependent 
variable “sales”. The results for this analysis are presented in Table 18 below. 
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Table 18: The Equity Model Regression Results with Top Performer Variable 
Considered 
Variable Beta 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
T-ratio P-
value 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9678 
Q10: COGS 1.1514 .1524 7.556*** .000 DF:  
24 
Q1: Regional Cooperative 1685500 1944000 .8670 .395 DW: 
2.4294 
Q19b: Total Rivals 64599 220500 .2929 .772 AIC: 
30.063 
pgQ10: COGS Top Performers -.088024 .1651 -.5333 .599 SC: 
30.430 
pgQ1: Regional Top Performers 
 
5976800 3068000 1.948** .063  
pgQ19b: Total Rivals Top 
Performers 
 
-124860 304300 -.4103 .685  
P1: Top Performer Dummy 
 
2845300 2274000 1.251 .223  
Intercept -177400 1728000 -.1027 .919  
t-test: * 10% significance     **5% significance     ***1% significance 
COGS: Cost of Goods Sold 
DF: Dickey Fuller Statistic 
DW: Durbin Watson Statistic 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Criterion 
 
Other than the cost of goods sold base variable, only the regional cooperatives in 
the top performing group had a significant individual impact at the 5% level for the new 
variables. The model has a good fit as shown by the high R2 and reasonably low AIC and 
SC. The Durbin Watson statistic is close to two, so the data does not appear to exhibit 
autocorrelation. However, no decided proof is provided for the argument that 
performance group significantly impacts this model. Therefore, a joint hypothesis test 
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was run for the performance group variables of the model. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H0: pg10 = pg1 = pg19b = p1 = 0 
H1: pg10 ≠ pg1 ≠ pg19b ≠ p1 ≠ 0 
Given these hypotheses, the f statistic for the joint test is 2.313 which is less than the 
critical value of 4.22 at the 1% significance level. The Wald Chi-Squared Statistic is 
9.252, which is less than the critical value of 13.227 at 4 degrees of freedom and 1% 
significance. Based on these two statistics, we fail to reject the null hypothesis as stated 
above and there is no significant difference obtained by the addition of the performance 
group to the analysis.  
6.3.4 The Loyalty Model 
The loyalty model is the most complex model of this group. The variables added 
to the regression include the performance group variables for the cost of goods sold, cash 
patronage distribution, number of business activities, the percent of time the manager 
spends on his greatest challenge, and whether or not the cooperative has no formal equity 
redemption policy. In addition two block variables were added for the top performance 
group, the top performers’ belief of the impact of loyalty on competitiveness and the top 
performer’s belief of the impact of customer service on loyalty. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 19 below.  
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Table 19: The Loyalty Model Regression Results with Top Performer Variable 
Considered 
Variable Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-ratio P-
value 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Q9: Sales 
    R2: 
.9952 
Q10: COGS 1.146 .1182 9.710*** .000 DF: 
16 
Q12: Cash Patronage Distribution 
 
2.2016 .8703 2.530** .022 DW: 
2.5693 
Q18b: Number of Business Activities 
 
96693 331900 .2913 .775 AIC: 
28.664 
Q20b: Percent of Time Manager 
Spends on Greatest Challenge 
-29512 1188000 -.02484 .980 SC: 
29.397 
Q21l: No Formal Equity Redemption 
Plan 
 
228170 991300 .2302 .821  
Q24l: Loyalty’s Impact on 
Competitiveness 
129540 993800 .1304 .898  
Q28l: Customer Service’s Impact on 
Loyalty 
-78620 547700 -.1435 .888  
pgQ10: COGS Top Performers 
 
-.17030 .1242 -1.372* .189  
pgQ12: Cash Patronage Distribution 
Top Performers 
-.76596 .8932 -.8575 .404  
pgQ18b: Number of Business 
Activities Top Performers 
-393260 599800 -.6557 .521  
pgQ20b: Percent of Time Top 
Performer Manager Spends on 
Greatest Challenge 
-2156700 1736000 -1.242 .232  
pgQ21l: No Formal Equity Plan Top 
Performers 
-5434000 1520000 -3.576*** .003  
pgQ24l: Loyalty’s Impact on 
Competitiveness for Top Performers 
-4237100 1342000 -3.158*** .006  
pgQ28l: Customer Service’s Impact 
on Loyalty for Top Performers 
-1492200 825100 -1.808** .089  
P1: Top Performer Dummy 
 
15408000 3657000 4.213*** .001  
Intercept -114440 2203000 -.05194 .959  
t-test: * 10% significance     **5% significance     ***1% significance 
COGS: Cost of Goods Sold 
DF: Dickey Fuller Statistic 
DW: Durbin Watson Statistic 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion 
SC: Schwarz Criterion 
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The variables for the top performer dummy, the two block variables, the cost of 
goods sold for top performers and the impact of top performers having no formal equity 
plan are all significant in this model. The R2 is high and the AIC and SC are sufficiently 
low to signify that this model fits the data well. Durbin Watson is close to two; therefore, 
the model does not appear to exhibit autocorrelation. We can conclude that individually 
the top performer variables explain the data reasonably well. What we don’t know is 
whether the total effect of these variables is significant. To this end a joint hypothesis 
test on the data will be performed with null and alternative hypotheses as follows: 
H0: pg10 = pg12 = pg18b = pg20b = pg21l = pg24l = pg28l = p1= 0 
H1: pg10 ≠ pg12 ≠ pg18b ≠ pg20b ≠ pg21l ≠ pg24l ≠ pg28l ≠ p1 ≠ 0 
The result of the joint hypothesis test is an f value of 5.32789 which is greater 
than the critical f value of 3.89 at the 1% significance level. The Wald Chi-Squared 
Statistic is 42.623, which is greater than the critical value of 20.090 with 8 degrees of 
freedom and 1% significance. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and in the loyalty 
model the addition of performance group variables will have a significant impact.  
6.4 Summary 
In summary, the performance group shifts the intercept significantly in the sales 
models that contain intervention variables for loyalty and competition, as well as in the 
basic model. The performance group is a slope shifter on one or more variables in 
loyalty, equity and competition models. No proof was exhibited that the collected impact 
of performance group is significant in the equity model. However, in the loyalty and 
competition models there is proof that P1 has a significant impact on the model.  
 
119 
CHAPTER VII 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
In summarizing this study, one must first begin with the current business 
environment. Cooperatives are in a very different world than could have been imagined 
as they were forming in the mid-1900s. Other studies have pointed to challenges 
cooperatives face including changing member demographics, competition, obtaining and 
managing equity, global marketing and others. Although these studies isolated and 
analyzed particular categories of these problems, few analyzed the problem with non-
financial factors taken into account. To summarize the results of this study we will first 
revisit the objectives of the study, followed by a discussion of the hypotheses presented 
in the procedures section.  
7.1 Summary of Objectives 
The objective of this study is to identify those perceptions and practices that 
separate successful, growing cooperative agribusinesses from stagnant ones. In 
beginning with the statistical summary we have shown that a difference does exist 
between the two groups. Generally, successful cooperatives are larger and more 
specialized. They are in a strong financial position that opens many possibilities for 
future expansion should they choose to pursue it. The perceptions of the managers of 
these cooperatives appear to exhibit confidence in the abilities of the cooperative 
employees, leadership and in the members themselves.  
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In contrast, bottom performers are not in a strong financial position and they 
appear to be unable to move forward due to financial and other limitations of the 
business. The perceptions of cooperative managers appear to place more emphasis on 
external factors such as government policies and number of competitors.  
When compared, there are three areas in which these two performance groups 
appear to differ. The first is the financial and operational form of the business, in which 
there is a stark difference between the top and bottom groups. This difference is expected 
due to the fact that they were separated based on financial ratios. The second is 
competition. The bottom performers appear face a more competitive situation than the 
top performers. The third is about the loyalty of the members. Top performers appear to 
be more concerned about loyalty than the bottom performers. In fact, one might even say 
that top performing firms place a strategic focus on internal issues while bottom 
performers concentrate on issues outside of the firm’s control. However, the reasons 
behind these observations require further analysis.  
The directed graphs provide useful information about causal relationships of 
performance factors and how management perceptions impact the business. The basic 
DAG provides a foundation for the remainder of the analysis. It was shown to be robust 
as evidenced by a common skeletal structure present in each model. The competition 
acyclic graph has some incongruities when the new variables are added; however, we 
know that they do have a causal influence on the basic DAG. It appears that government 
policies and cooperative leadership has the greatest impact on the competitive situation 
of the firm.  
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The equity DAG does not exhibit a great change from the basic DAG, except that 
being a regional cooperative appears to create a new connection and changes the paths of 
the model. The federated cooperative’s members are businesses rather than individuals, 
which may be causing equity to have a stronger causal influence in the DAG. Similarly, 
the strategic planning DAG does not appear to change greatly from the basic DAG. The 
strategic planning variables intervene at the number of locations, causing a new sink. 
This new sink is caused by other strategic planning variables as well, which leads to a 
consideration of whether the physical size of a cooperative makes strategic planning 
more necessary. 
The final DAG is related to loyalty in the cooperative. This presents the most 
complex set of relationships in the study. Loyalty variables only results in five sinks: age 
of oldest stock, how critical it is to improve member service, the number of active 
members, sales and membership size increase. The number of business activities, which 
was previously a sink variable, becomes a root cause in the context of loyalty. It is 
interesting that this variable is a Markovian parent of all sink variables except the age of 
the oldest stock. Other authors have shown that memberships are becoming 
heterogeneous and this is resulting in cooperatives being asked to meet a diverse number 
of needs. The number of business activities the cooperative is involved in becoming a 
root cause in the context of loyalty could be reflective of this relationship.  
Another interesting change from the other DAGs is that the percent of time the 
manager spends on his/her greatest challenge is a root cause of every sink in the 
diagram. Time management has been presented at numerous board and manager training 
 
122 
seminars. This diagram shows a direct causal relationship between the management’s 
ability to effectively allocate time and the other loyalty variables of the business. 
Another variable that previously had no connection to the graph is whether or not the 
cooperative has a formal equity redemption policy. Although equity redemption was not 
shown to be significant on its own, when connected through the loyalty variables it 
becomes a root cause.  
The final and perhaps most powerful conclusion is that the human factors (board 
expertise, community involvement, general manager expertise, employee expertise) are 
at the beginning of the causal chain for every sink variable. This leads to the conclusion 
that the manager’s perception is that loyalty begins with the people in cooperatives rather 
than with the price. Whether or not this is an accurate representation of membership’s 
perceptions is still unknown.  
Directed graphs provided a basis for further econometric analysis. DAG roots 
and sinks provided structural equations for simple regressions. The only models that 
yielded some interesting results were those models in which the dependent (sink) 
variable was sales. In addition, slope and intercept shifters were added to evaluate the 
statistical difference of performance groups. Intercept and slope shifters were jointly 
significant for each of the loyalty and competition models. This result is in agreement 
with what had suggested by the statistical summary and the DAGs.  
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7.2 Hypotheses Revisited 
At this point, the hypotheses made in Chapter III can be discussed and some 
conclusions made as to whether or not they should be rejected. The first hypothesis is: 
H1: Cooperatives that actively participate in strategic planning will experience greater 
financial performance.  
Although strategic planning appears to have some impact on the business, there is 
no evidence that strategic planning will cause the cooperative to be in the top 
performance group. Both the top and bottom cooperatives participate in strategic 
planning, and there appears to be no measurable difference in the perceptions of top 
performer management and bottom performer management relating to strategic 
performance. For the purposes of this study we reject this hypothesis; however, we 
recognize that cooperatives that have recently begun participating in strategic planning 
may not see the fruits of their work until years into the future. Therefore, this hypothesis 
is outside of the scope of this study in the short term.  
H2: Cooperatives with a greater understanding of their equity position will experience 
greater financial performance.  
There is a significant difference in the number of companies that have formal 
equity redemption polices between the top and bottom performers, but there is little 
difference in the perceptions of management relating to their equity redemption policy. 
In this sample, the directed graph for equity redemption changes very little. In the 
regression analysis, the intercept and slope shifters were not significantly different from 
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zero. Therefore, understanding of the equity position is rejected as a driver of greater 
financial performance.  
H3: Cooperative performance will be negatively impacted by competition. 
There is a definite difference in the competitive situation of the top performers 
and the bottom performers. Furthermore the basic firm model is significantly impacted 
by competitive variables. In the regression analysis, the slope and intercept shifters are 
able to significantly explain the data. Therefore, we fail to reject this hypothesis. This 
conclusion agrees with the literature as well. 
H4: Cooperatives that value member loyalty will experience greater financial 
performance.  
Member loyalty and the perceptions of management relating to member loyalty 
appear to be of slightly more concern to top performers. However, in the DAG and 
regression analysis it is not the perceptions of management as much as the membership 
structure and operational structure of the firm that form significant impacts on the basic 
model. Furthermore, the top performer intercept and slope shifters significantly explain 
the loyalty regression, which causes an interesting conclusion. As stated in H4, we reject 
the hypothesis. However, this study suggests that the causal relationship we 
hypothesized might be reversed. We could create a new hypothesis positing that greater 
financial performance significantly impacts member loyalty and its importance in the 
business.  
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7.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
This study is justified in that it provides the first step in what could be a series of 
studies relating to loyalty, competition, equity, strategic planning and others. However, 
the sample size obtained for this study limits what can be done with the data due to 
degrees of freedom restrictions. A more complete picture of performance could be 
obtained by repeating the survey for multiple years to get not only a range of financial 
information but also to track how perceptions change over time and its correlation to 
financial data.  
Although effort was made to include all relevant variables it is possible that other 
variables exist that could impact the performance of these cooperatives; therefore, future 
studies should always be open to the inclusion of other potential variables. Furthermore, 
the number of bottom performers makes the comparison between successful and stagnant 
cooperative more difficult. If there were some way to encourage small, struggling 
cooperatives to include their responses in such a study it could be more precise in its 
analysis than what was presented here.  
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